

# Online Appendix for Mobilizing memories: The social conditions of the long-term impact of victimization

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## A Political parties coded as leftist

Table A1 shows which political parties were coded as leftist in every election after 1977. Among them, I include both major, country-wide parties such as PSOE or PCE, as well as the leftist nationalist parties in the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, such as *Euskadiko Ezkerra* (EE), *Herri Batasuna* (HB), or *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC).

**Table A1:** Political parties coded as leftist in each election

1977	PSOE, PCE, PSP, EE, EC-FED
1979	PSOE, PCE, EE, ERFN, HB, EE
1982	PSOE, PCE, EE, HB, ERC
1986	PSOE, IU, MUC, PST, PCC, AV, LV, UPR, PORE, HB, EE, ERC, PSG.EG, BNG
1989	PSOE, IU, LV.LV, LVE, PTE, PST, PCPE, LV, HB, EA, EE, ERC, BNG, PSG.EG, AV.MEC
1993	PSOE, IU, LV, LE, PST, PCPE, PEC-LV, HB, ERC, EA.EUE, ERC, BNG
1996	PSOE, IU, LV, PRT, PEC, CHA, BNG, HB, ERC, EA
2000	PSOE, IU, ICV, LV, LV-GV, PCPE, POSI, EV-AV, CHA, BNG, ERC, EA
2004	PSOE, IU, CHA, EV-AE, IR, PCPE, LV, ERC, BNG, EA, NaBai, Aralar
2008	PSOE, IU, PACMA, LV, CHA, LV-GV, EV-AE, PSD, ERC, BNG, NaBai, EA, Aralar
2011	PSOE, IU-LV, Equo, PACMA, PCPE, Anticapitalistas, Amaiur, ERC, BNG, GeBai
2015	PSOE, Podemos, En Com, IU-Unidad Popular, En Marea-Podemos, PACMA, Recordes Cero, PCPE, Por la Izquierda, ERC, EH Bildu, Ns, GeBai
2016	PSOE, En Marea-Podemos, En Com Podem, Unidos Podemos, PACMA, Recortes Cero-GV, PCPE, ERC, EH Bildu, BNG-Ns, GeBai


AV, Alternativa Verda; MEC, Moviment Ecologista de Catalunya; BNG, Bloque Nacionalista Galego; CHA, Chunta Aragonesista; EA, Eusko Alkartasuna; EUE, Euskal Ezkerra; EC-FED, Esquerra de Catalunya-Front Electoral Democrtic; EE, Euskadiko Ezkerra; ERC, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya; ERFN, Esquerra Republicana - Front Nacional; EV, Els Verds; GeBAI, Geroa Bai; HB, Herri Batasuna; ICV, Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds; IR, Izquierda Republicana; IU, Izquierda Unida; LV, Los Verdes; GV, Grupo Verde; MUC, Mesa por la Unidad de los Comunistas; NaBai, Nafarroa Bai; PACMA, Partido Animalistas contra el Maltrato Animal; PCC, Partit dels Comunistes de Catalunya; PCE, Partido Comunista Espao; PCPE, Partido Comunista de los Pueblos de Espaa; PEC, Partit Ecologista de Catalunya; PORE, Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Espaa); POSI, Partido Obrero Socialista Internacionalista; PRT, Partido Republicano del Trabajo; PSD, Partido Socialista Democrtico; PSG.EG, Partido Socialista Galego-Esquerda Galega; PSOE, Partido Socialista Obrero Espao; PSP, Partido Socialista Popular; PST, Partido Socialista del Trabajo; PTE, Partido de los Trabajadores de Espaa; UPR, Unidad Popular Republicana.

## B Selection of municipalities within Spain

The analyses in the main text uses data from slightly over 2,000 municipalities, which correspond to roughly a quarter of all municipalities in Spain, covering 13 provinces out of a total of 50 provinces (plus two autonomous cities). This sample responds to issues of data availability and, in principle, the sample offers a wide range of variation in terms of social, political and economic differences. An open question however is whether we can expect that these 2,000+ municipalities are a good representation of the full Spanish territory.


Although most data used in the main analyses is not available for all municipalities, I compare here the municipalities in the sample with the rest, using two datasets that are available for the whole country: population data and electoral results after 1977.

Figure A1 shows the population in 1940 for all municipalities, displaying those included in the sample along with those in provinces not covered by the dataset. The average population in the municipalities in the sample is 2963, in those out of the sample is 3079. Although the difference between both distributions (when using the logged population) is statistically significant, mainly because of the sample size, the magnitude is minimal. Figure A2 shows the change in population between 1940 and 1970 between municipalities in and out of the sample. Again, although municipalities in the sample experienced more population growth, the differences are not large: the coefficient for being out of sample in a linear regression of population change is -0.097.




**Figure A1:** Population in 1940

Turning to electoral data, figure A3 shows the share of vote to leftist parties (see table A1) in all municipalities in and out of the sample, across all the elections since 1977. Municipalities in the sample are slightly more leftist, but in this case the difference is even smaller: the coefficient term for being out of sample on leftist vote share is just -0.001.




**Figure A2:** Population change 1940–1970




**Figure A3:** Municipality-level vote share to leftist parties since 1977

Figure A4 shows the evolution in the average vote share to leftist parties in each province across all elections. Again, the graph suggests that there are no large differences between those provinces included in the sample and those that are not. Perhaps the biggest outliers are found in the Basque Country (see figure A5), but in any case, in the last section of this appendix the main results are replicated excluding the three Basque provinces from the sample (see section E.2).

All in all, although this is not definite evidence, comparing municipalities in and out of the sample based on population data and electoral results after 1977 suggests that the provinces included in the sample do represent well the whole territory of Spain. As argued in the main text, we should not expect any significant biases when extrapolating the results to the whole country.



**Figure A4:** Mean vote share to leftist parties in each province



**Figure A5:** Mean vote share to leftist parties in each province

## C Full tables of DiD models

Table [A2a](#) (continued in tables [A2b](#) and [A2c](#)) shows the full results of the main models displayed graphically in the main text, corresponding to models 1-4.

Similarly, [A3a](#) (continued in [A3b](#) and [A3c](#)) shows the full results of models 9-11, which correspond to the analyses of the organizational persistence alternative explanation.

**Table A2a: Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.162*** (0.009)	0.144*** (0.010)	0.141*** (0.010)	0.130*** (0.011)
Election 1977	-0.109*** (0.006)	-0.104*** (0.009)	-0.107*** (0.008)	-0.104*** (0.009)
Election 1979	-0.059*** (0.006)	-0.069*** (0.009)	-0.061*** (0.008)	-0.070*** (0.009)
Election 1982	-0.012* (0.006)	0.009 (0.009)	0.014+ (0.008)	0.008 (0.009)
Election 1986	-0.009 (0.006)	0.034*** (0.009)	0.036*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.009)
Election 1989	0.017** (0.006)	0.062*** (0.009)	0.067*** (0.008)	0.062*** (0.009)
Election 1993	0.054*** (0.006)	0.069*** (0.009)	0.075*** (0.008)	0.069*** (0.009)
Election 1996	0.048*** (0.006)	0.096*** (0.009)	0.097*** (0.008)	0.096*** (0.009)
Election 2000	-0.018** (0.006)	0.033*** (0.009)	0.033*** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.009)
Election 2004	0.117*** (0.006)	0.137*** (0.009)	0.136*** (0.008)	0.137*** (0.009)
Election 2008	0.114*** (0.006)	0.142*** (0.009)	0.142*** (0.008)	0.142*** (0.009)
Election 2011	0.017** (0.006)	0.047*** (0.009)	0.043*** (0.008)	0.047*** (0.009)
Election 2015	0.123*** (0.006)	0.128*** (0.009)	0.128*** (0.008)	0.129*** (0.009)
Election 2016	0.135*** (0.006)	0.124*** (0.009)	0.122*** (0.008)	0.124*** (0.009)
Wartime victimization	-0.008 (0.006)	0.012 (0.009)	0.002 (0.005)	0.009 (0.009)
Networks (TOP activity)		0.031*** (0.009)	0.019* (0.008)	0.031*** (0.009)
Change pop 1940-70	0.029*** (0.001)	0.029*** (0.001)	0.029*** (0.001)	0.037*** (0.002)
Log. Population 1970	0.015*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.001)	0.017*** (0.001)	0.018*** (0.001)
Unions (CNT)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.003)
Unions (UGT)	-0.034*** (0.004)	-0.034*** (0.004)	-0.035*** (0.004)	0.0005 (0.006)
Leftist vote 1936	0.254*** (0.005)	0.253*** (0.005)	0.253*** (0.005)	0.245*** (0.006)
Elec. competition 1936	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.010* (0.004)
Terrain ruggedness	0.00004*** (0.00001)	0.00004*** (0.00001)	0.00003*** (0.00001)	0.00004*** (0.00001)
(...)				

**Table A2b: Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase (cont)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(...)				
1977 x Victimization	0.012 (0.008)	-0.018 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.019 (0.013)
1979 x Victimization	0.028*** (0.008)	0.011 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.011 (0.013)
1982 x Victimization	0.039*** (0.008)	0.014 (0.013)	0.002 (0.008)	0.013 (0.013)
1986 x Victimization	0.042*** (0.008)	0.006 (0.013)	0.001 (0.008)	0.006 (0.013)
1989 x Victimization	0.044*** (0.008)	0.001 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.0001 (0.013)
1993 x Victimization	0.028*** (0.008)	0.008 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.007 (0.013)
1996 x Victimization	0.023** (0.008)	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.014 (0.013)
2000 x Victimization	0.013 (0.008)	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.018 (0.013)
2004 x Victimization	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.017 (0.013)
2008 x Victimization	0.003 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.013)
2011 x Victimization	-0.00003 (0.008)	-0.021 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.021 (0.013)
2015 x Victimization	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.016 (0.013)
2016 x Victimization	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.013)
1977 x TOP		-0.010 (0.012)	0.004 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.012)
1979 x TOP		0.019 (0.012)	0.031** (0.011)	0.018 (0.012)
1982 x TOP		-0.038** (0.012)	-0.030** (0.011)	-0.039** (0.012)
1986 x TOP		-0.077*** (0.012)	-0.063*** (0.011)	-0.078*** (0.012)
1989 x TOP		-0.081*** (0.012)	-0.068*** (0.011)	-0.082*** (0.012)
1993 x TOP		-0.026* (0.012)	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.027* (0.012)
1996 x TOP		-0.086*** (0.012)	-0.075*** (0.011)	-0.087*** (0.012)
2000 x TOP		-0.091*** (0.012)	-0.086*** (0.011)	-0.092*** (0.012)
2004 x TOP		-0.036** (0.012)	-0.037*** (0.011)	-0.037** (0.012)
2008 x TOP		-0.050*** (0.012)	-0.048*** (0.011)	-0.051*** (0.012)
(...)				

**Table A2c: Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase (cont)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(...)				
2011 x TOP		-0.053*** (0.012)	-0.047*** (0.011)	-0.054*** (0.012)
2015 x TOP		-0.010 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.012)
2016 x TOP		0.021 <sup>+</sup> (0.012)	0.027* (0.011)	0.020 (0.012)
Victimization x TOP		-0.035** (0.012)	-0.012 <sup>+</sup> (0.007)	-0.034** (0.012)
1977 x Vict. x TOP		0.045** (0.016)	0.017 <sup>+</sup> (0.010)	0.035* (0.017)
1979 x Vict. x TOP		0.021 (0.016)	0.004 (0.010)	0.011 (0.017)
1982 x Vict. x TOP		0.044** (0.017)	0.026** (0.010)	0.038* (0.017)
1986 x Vict. x TOP		0.066*** (0.016)	0.036*** (0.010)	0.061*** (0.017)
1989 x Vict. x TOP		0.078*** (0.016)	0.046*** (0.010)	0.074*** (0.017)
1993 x Vict. x TOP		0.034* (0.016)	0.017 <sup>+</sup> (0.010)	0.034* (0.017)
1996 x Vict. x TOP		0.068*** (0.016)	0.040*** (0.010)	0.069*** (0.017)
2000 x Vict. x TOP		0.061*** (0.016)	0.040*** (0.010)	0.066*** (0.017)
2004 x Vict. x TOP		0.024 (0.016)	0.019 <sup>+</sup> (0.010)	0.032 <sup>+</sup> (0.017)
2008 x Vict. x TOP		0.027 (0.016)	0.018 <sup>+</sup> (0.010)	0.034* (0.017)
2011 x Vict. x TOP		0.040* (0.016)	0.021* (0.010)	0.046** (0.017)
2015 x Vict. x TOP		0.018 (0.016)	0.006 (0.010)	0.024 (0.017)
2016 x Vict. x TOP		-0.005 (0.016)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.002 (0.017)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>n</i>	28,626	28,626	28,626	26,666
R <sup>2</sup>	0.403	0.410	0.410	0.398
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.402	0.408	0.408	0.397

**Note:** + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Results for difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections, corresponding to models 1-4 shown in the main text. Models 2-4 include an interaction with the network variable, which in every model refers to TOP activity in the same municipality or its neighbors within 10km. Model 3 includes the wartime victimization variable in its continuous form (log. killings / 1,000 inhabitants), while Model 4 restricts the sample to town below 10,000 inhabitants. Province FE not shown.



**Table A3a: Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	0.172*** (0.009)	0.162*** (0.009)	0.150*** (0.010)
Election 1977	-0.114*** (0.006)	-0.110*** (0.006)	-0.115*** (0.006)
Election 1979	-0.063*** (0.006)	-0.049*** (0.006)	-0.064*** (0.006)
Election 1982	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.017** (0.006)
Election 1986	-0.012+ (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.013* (0.006)
Election 1989	0.015* (0.006)	0.026*** (0.006)	0.014* (0.006)
Election 1993	0.054*** (0.006)	0.065*** (0.006)	0.053*** (0.006)
Election 1996	0.047*** (0.006)	0.054*** (0.006)	0.047*** (0.006)
Election 2000	-0.019** (0.006)	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.019** (0.006)
Election 2004	0.117*** (0.006)	0.117*** (0.006)	0.117*** (0.006)
Election 2008	0.114*** (0.006)	0.116*** (0.006)	0.114*** (0.006)
Election 2011	0.017** (0.006)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.017** (0.006)
Election 2015	0.124*** (0.006)	0.128*** (0.006)	0.124*** (0.006)
Election 2016	0.137*** (0.006)	0.141*** (0.006)	0.137*** (0.006)
Wartime victimization	-0.011+ (0.006)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.014* (0.006)
Trade Unions	0.006 (0.019)	0.017 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.020)
Change pop 1940-70	0.030*** (0.001)	0.029*** (0.001)	0.036*** (0.002)
Log. Population 1970	0.014*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.001)	0.018*** (0.001)
Networks (TOP activity)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)
Leftist vote 1936	0.252*** (0.005)	0.253*** (0.005)	0.245*** (0.006)
Elec. competition 1936	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.009* (0.004)
Terrain ruggedness	0.00003*** (0.00001)	0.00003*** (0.00001)	0.00004*** (0.00001)
(...)			

**Table A3b: Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase (cont)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(...)			
1977 x Victimization	0.010 (0.009)	0.002 (0.005)	0.006 (0.009)
1979 x Victimization	0.027** (0.009)	0.0004 (0.005)	0.023** (0.009)
1982 x Victimization	0.040*** (0.009)	0.017** (0.005)	0.037*** (0.009)
1986 x Victimization	0.043*** (0.009)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.041*** (0.009)
1989 x Victimization	0.047*** (0.009)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.044*** (0.009)
1993 x Victimization	0.034*** (0.009)	0.009+ (0.005)	0.032*** (0.009)
1996 x Victimization	0.030*** (0.009)	0.012* (0.005)	0.028** (0.009)
2000 x Victimization	0.021* (0.009)	0.012* (0.005)	0.021* (0.009)
2004 x Victimization	0.004 (0.009)	0.003 (0.005)	0.005 (0.009)
2008 x Victimization	0.012 (0.009)	0.006 (0.005)	0.012 (0.009)
2011 x Victimization	0.010 (0.009)	0.004 (0.005)	0.010 (0.009)
2015 x Victimization	0.005 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.006 (0.009)
2016 x Victimization	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.009)
1977 x Unions	0.091*** (0.027)	0.059*** (0.018)	0.090** (0.028)
1979 x Unions	0.078** (0.027)	0.070*** (0.018)	0.079** (0.028)
1982 x Unions	0.077** (0.027)	0.040* (0.018)	0.079** (0.028)
1986 x Unions	0.056* (0.027)	0.028 (0.018)	0.060* (0.028)
1989 x Unions	0.039 (0.027)	0.017 (0.018)	0.043 (0.028)
1993 x Unions	0.014 (0.027)	0.005 (0.018)	0.019 (0.028)
1996 x Unions	0.020 (0.027)	-0.011 (0.018)	0.023 (0.028)
2000 x Unions	0.020 (0.027)	-0.023 (0.018)	0.024 (0.028)
2004 x Unions	0.00004 (0.027)	-0.029 (0.018)	0.003 (0.028)
2008 x Unions	-0.002 (0.027)	-0.027 (0.018)	0.002 (0.028)
(...)			

**Table A3c: Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase (cont)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(...)			
2011 x Unions	-0.009 (0.027)	-0.041* (0.018)	-0.004 (0.028)
2015 x Unions	-0.028 (0.027)	-0.035* (0.018)	-0.024 (0.028)
2016 x Unions	-0.042 (0.027)	-0.033+ (0.018)	-0.039 (0.028)
Victimization x Unions	0.016 (0.021)	-0.0003 (0.010)	0.043+ (0.023)
1977 x Vict. x Unions	-0.059* (0.030)	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.084** (0.032)
1979 x Vict. x Unions	-0.053+ (0.030)	-0.025+ (0.013)	-0.077* (0.032)
1982 x Vict. x Unions	-0.060* (0.030)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.070* (0.032)
1986 x Vict. x Unions	-0.048 (0.030)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.059+ (0.032)
1989 x Vict. x Unions	-0.044 (0.030)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.059+ (0.032)
1993 x Vict. x Unions	-0.037 (0.030)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.050 (0.032)
1996 x Vict. x Unions	-0.044 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.049 (0.032)
2000 x Vict. x Unions	-0.052+ (0.030)	0.0005 (0.013)	-0.047 (0.032)
2004 x Vict. x Unions	-0.040 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.033 (0.032)
2008 x Vict. x Unions	-0.038 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.033 (0.032)
2011 x Vict. x Unions	-0.040 (0.030)	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.046 (0.032)
2015 x Vict. x Unions	-0.023 (0.030)	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.031 (0.032)
2016 x Vict. x Unions	-0.011 (0.030)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.019 (0.032)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>n</i>	28,626	28,626	26,666
R <sup>2</sup>	0.405	0.405	0.394
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.404	0.403	0.392

**Note:** + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Results for difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections, conditional on the existence of prewar trade unions, corresponding to models 9-11 shown in the main text. Second column includes the wartime victimization variable in its continuous form (log. killings / 1,000 inhabitants), while the third column restricts the sample to town below 10,000 inhabitants. Province FE not shown.

## D Base models and matching


A potential problem with the results shown in the main text is that the distribution of violence could be related to the subsequent evolution of leftist vote. In other words, the allocation of the treatment might not be independent from the outcome. To some extent, this is a valid concern: violence during the Spanish Civil War had a strong ideological dimension. However, I argue that because of the bottom-up nature of victimization patterns during the civil war, the way violence evolved endogenously during the conflict, and the relatively exogenous distribution of territorial control (Balcells, 2017), there should be enough variation in terms of exposure to violence to credibly support the argument. Moreover, rather than the plain effect of violence, the focus of this article is on the mediating effect of postwar underground activity and the conditions under which a long-term effect of violence is possible.

Because of the focus on this post-treatment variable, it would not be ideal to apply matching techniques or other statistical methods of causal inference that attempt to model the probability of being assigned into treatment based on pre-treatment variables. In other words, matching on pre-violence variable would not attain balance on the variable of interest. Despite this, as an additional test, I estimate here a matched difference-in-differences (MDID) (Abadie, 2005) on the base model without the main interaction with the network variable (model 1 in the main text) and including only prewar control variables: leftist support in 1936, electoral competition in 1936, log. population in 1930, presence of prewar trade unions, and terrain ruggedness. This design follows recent works that also attempt to measure the local-level effect of violence on different outcomes (Barceló, 2018; Carrasco, Durán-Bustamante & others, 2018). The goal of these analyses is to test the robustness of the base model to a more conservative inferential method, checking that using a matching design does not fundamentally alter the base effect of violence.

In particular, I run three models using the complete sample and two matched datasets using two standard methods: nearest neighbor with replacement and coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Ho, Imai, King & Stuart, 2007; Iacus, King & Porro, 2012). Figure A6 shows the results, and table A4 shows the balance statistics of the matched datasets, including the improvement of each matching method in terms of the difference in means between the control and treatment groups, and results of a t-test between the distribution of each variable in the control and treatment groups.

The goal of these analyses is to test the robustness of the base model to a more conservative inferential method. Again, victimization during the civil war is linked to an increase in leftist vote during the first half of the democratic period in Spain, particu-

larly during the mid-1980s. Although selecting on observables still has limitations, results show here that the basic result on the effect of victimization, without the network interaction, holds when estimating the model on a matched dataset.



**Figure A6: Base model and matching**

Coefficient plot for three difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections, equivalent to model 1 in main text. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown. Using only prewar variables as controls and for matching.

**Table A4: Balance statistics matching**

All data						
Treated = 1158, Control = 888						
	Mean Tr	Mean C	Diff			
Distance	0.66	0.44	0.23			
Leftist support 1936	0.40	0.37	0.04			
Competition 1936	0.79	0.73	0.05			
Log Population 1930	7.52	6.57	0.95			
Trade unions	0.21	0.05	0.16			
Ruggedness	102.71	112.52	-9.81			
Matched data (nearest neighbor)						
Treated = 1158, Control = 433						
	Mean Tr	Mean C	Diff	% Improv.	T-test	P-value
Distance	0.66	0.66	0.00	99.57	0.08	0.93
Leftist support 1936	0.40	0.39	0.01	65.51	1.01	0.31
Competition 1936	0.79	0.77	0.02	64.80	1.27	0.20
Log Population 1930	7.52	7.47	0.05	94.49	0.89	0.38
Trade unions	0.21	0.16	0.06	64.88	2.50	0.01
Ruggedness	102.71	90.22	12.49	-27.33	2.76	0.01
Matched data (coarsened exact matching)						
Treated = 717, Control = 644						
	Mean Tr	Mean C	Diff	% Improv.	T-test	P-value
Distance	0.57	0.56	0.02	92.54	1.63	0.10
Leftist support 1936	0.37	0.38	-0.00	94.27	-0.19	0.85
Competition 1936	0.79	0.79	0.00	96.72	0.12	0.90
Log Population 1930	7.02	6.95	0.06	93.60	1.52	0.13
Trade unions	0.07	0.07	0.00	100.00	-0.00	1.00
Ruggedness	79.97	82.29	-2.32	76.35	-0.73	0.47

## E Robustness tests

### E.1 Spatial Dependency

Another source of concern for the main results is spatial dependency among neighboring municipalities. In other words, the increase in leftist vote in a given municipality could be due to the exposure to victimization in a neighboring municipality, either because people learn of violence in nearby areas and react in the same way as if it had taken place in their own territory, or because the exposed population experience a change in preferences and this outcome affects nearby municipalities.

Accounting for this problem, figure A7 replicates the main result (model 2 in main text) including a spatial lag of violence across three different specifications: controlling for the existence of victimization in contiguous municipalities, and neighboring municipalities (model A4) within 5km (model A5) and 10km (model A6). The distance-based specifications refers to the minimum distance between borders.


Figure A7 shows that the results are identical when including the spatial lags, which suggests that spatial dependency or spill-over effects should not be a concern when interpreting the results.

### E.2 Excluding the Basque Country

Figure A8 shows the results of replicating the main analyses testing hypothesis H2 (models 2-4 in main text) but excluding all municipalities from the three Basque provinces (Bizkaia, Alava, and Gipuzkoa). The reason for doing this is that the victimization data for the Basque Country is a preliminary list and thus subject to changes, although they are likely to be minimal. Moreover, the main mediator variable, the indicator of underground opposition activity, might work differently in the Basque Country because of the probable higher repressive activity due to the existence of violent terrorism in the Basque region during the late Francoism. In any case, the three models in figure A8 show that the results excluding the Basque Country are essentially similar to the full sample and, if anything, evidence for the main argument is stronger.

### E.3 Distance buffer in underground networks variable


Figure A9 shows the results of estimating model 2 in main text using different specifications of the network variable. In particular, models A7–A9 use, respectively, an indicator of network activity in the municipality or in neighbors within 5km, within 10km, or re-



**Figure A7:** Coefficient plot for main results, controlling for spatial dependency

Coefficient plot for three difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections, equivalent to model 2 in main text, including a spatial lag of violence. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown.






**Figure A8:** Coefficient plot for main results, excluding Basque Country

Coefficient plot for three difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections, equivalent to models 2-4 in main text. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown.

moving the neighbor condition. Results are again similar to the main model, with the exception of model A12, in which the network variable only indicates network activity in the same municipality. This result suggests that the effect of underground activity extended to municipalities in the immediately surrounding areas. Interestingly, when included a limited version of the network variable (i.e. only in the municipalities where there was such activity), the effect of the existence of networks in municipalities without victimization is positive which, together with the absence of a significant interaction, suggests that in municipalities where opposition networks originated there was an increase in leftist vote irrespectively of wartime victimization.


#### **E.4 Leftist victimization**

Finally, figure [A10](#) estimates models that take into account leftist victimization, using data from those provinces where data on victimization by Republican forces is available (the analyses exclude Lugo, Albacete, Bizkaia, Alava, and Gipuzkoa). Model A13 and A14 include leftist victimization as a control variable, using a binary and a continuous (log. killings per 1,000 population) version, respectively. Results do not change from the ones in the main text. Model A15 uses leftist victimization as the main victimization variable in the interaction, as a sort of placebo analyses. If results were similar to those using rightist victimization, it would either provide support for the alternative explanation on organizational persistence, or suggest another confounding problem. However, leftist victimization does not show any significant effect.



**Figure A9:** Coefficient plot for main results, different networks specifications

Coefficient plot for three difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown.



**Figure A10:** Coefficient plot for main results, accounting for leftist victimization

Coefficient plot for three difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown.

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