

# Mobilizing memories: The social conditions of the long-term impact of victimization

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## **Abstract**

Recent research has focused on the legacies of civil war violence on political preferences, finding that wartime victimization decreases support for the perpetrator or its political identity in the long run. However, we know little about the conditions under which this effect takes place. Historical accounts from civil wars suggest that the long-term effect of violence is not homogenous, nor consistent across areas within a single conflict. Addressing this gap, this article explores the effects of wartime victimization on long-term political preferences at the local level, looking at the conditioning effect of the local social context. In particular, I argue that the effect of wartime violence depends on the existence of local networks that create and maintain memories of the violence, and capitalize on them for future mobilization. This argument is tested in the context of the Spanish Civil War. I build a novel dataset using archival data, historical secondary sources, and already existing datasets, covering 2,100 municipalities across Spain. In line with the argument, it is found that Francoist wartime victimization during the civil war is linked to an increase in leftist vote share after democracy was restored four decades later, but mainly in those municipalities where clandestine, left-leaning political networks were active after the conflict.

**Keywords:** political violence, civil war legacies, Spain

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## Introduction

Recent research has explored the long-term effects of civil war violence on political preferences, and has found that civilian victimization can lead to a long-term rejection of the perpetrator or its political identity (Balcells, 2012; Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017; Fontana, Nannicini & Tabellini, 2017; Rozenas, Schutte & Zhukov, 2017). However, we know little about why and when violence has such effect. Moreover, historical accounts suggest a more complex story.

In the mining valleys of Asturias, in the north of Spain, the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) involved intensive victimization of the civilian population. Years later, during the Francoist regime, when the clandestine labor movement developed in these same mining and industrial towns, the memories of the civil war played an important role in the mobilization of the next generation. Despite the paralyzing effect of repression, strong social networks helped to create collective memories and perpetuate the labor culture that had been harshly repressed during the civil war. It might not be surprising that this area is still a stronghold of communist and socialist ideology.

These valleys, however, are not the norm in Spain. In many other parts of the country, networks of opposition to the Francoist regime were much weaker, or did not exist at all. There, violent repression during the civil war and its aftermath had been much more successful in rooting out pockets of leftist support and demobilizing the entire population. Memories of victimization became a social taboo and people would quickly brush over the reasons why a relative had been killed during the war, even in private family conversations. Contrary to the Asturian valleys, these areas lacked a favorable environment in which collective memories could be kept alive and resonate within the community. In this context, there was no leftist mobilization in response to violence. If the seed of revolution is repression, not all soils are equally fertile.

The importance of the social context for the transmission of wartime memories and its subsequent impact on political attitudes is the focus of this article. In particular, I study the local-level legacies of wartime violence against civilians, and argue that a backfiring effect against the perpetrator's political identity as a result of victimization is dependent

on the presence of relevant political networks that create, maintain, and mobilize on memories of the violence.

To test this argument, I create a novel dataset covering 2,100 municipalities in 13 provinces of Spain, including information on many political phenomena at the local level across several decades. In particular, I analyze the long-term effect of Francoist violence against civilians during and immediately after the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), and test whether this effect varies depending on the existence of clandestine left-wing networks during the Francoist regime (1939–1977). Results support the argument. Using a difference-in-differences setup, I find that wartime victimization during the civil war is linked to an increase in leftist vote share when democracy was restored four decades later, but mainly in those municipalities where clandestine political networks were active during the dictatorship. Moreover, I rule out that either wartime violence is causing both postwar clandestine activity and leftist vote increase or that it is just a story about organizational persistence.

Even though the empirical evidence comes from a single case, exploiting internal variation within Spain helps us to understand how single-case findings on the effect of victimization might travel to other countries. In particular, the results suggest that the survival of wartime memories and its translation into preferences hinges upon the action by political actors or networks. While in the case of Spain I point to the role of underground left-leaning political networks, other type of actors –such as victims associations or local political brokers– could have the same effect in other countries.

This article contributes to the literature on the consequences of political violence. Despite burgeoning recent research on the legacies of violence, we still know little about their social determinants and how they vary within a conflict. Here I argue that such an effect is not homogenous, but conditional on the work done by political actors and organizations in turning wartime events into collective memories and, thus, influencing political behavior in the long run. Moreover, this article also speaks to previous research on the relationship between local organizations and networks and electoral persistence, particularly during periods of authoritarian rule.

## The legacies of political violence

In recent years, an emerging research agenda has focused on the effect of exposure to violence on individuals' social and political attitudes. The main finding is that violence increases pro-social behavior towards members of the same social group, which often translates into increased capacity for collective action (Bellows & Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Voors et al., 2012; Gilligan, Pasquale & Samii, 2014; González & Miguel, 2015; Bauer et al., 2016). Related to this, similar studies suggest that, also at the individual level, exposure to violence is related to less potential for ethnic reconciliation (Bakke, O'Loughlin & Ward, 2009; Beber, Roessler & Scacco, 2014) and less political trust (Grosjean, 2014; De Juan & Pierskalla, 2016).

These findings are limited to the analyses of relatively short-term effects and, in most cases, do not offer explicit insights about the effects of violence on preferences vis-a-vis the perpetrator or other political forces. The long-term legacies of violence on political preferences is still an understudied topic. Balcells (2012) and Lupu & Peisakhin (2017) try to fill this gap, tracking changes on individual attitudes across generations in Spain and Ukraine and find that exposure to violence leads to a rejection of the perpetrator's political identity. Despite their importance in providing new evidence, one of their limitations is that comparing individuals who were exposed to violence with those who were not omits those processes that take place at the level of communities. Particularly when looking at longer time periods, the effect of social networks or organizations at the local level is likely to play a big role in the transmission of wartime memories and their translation into political ideologies. Moreover, an exclusive focus on individuals sidelines the way violence can radicalize entire communities and turn them into ideological strongholds.

The few works that investigate local legacies of conflict support the idea that local-level processes are important. Daly (2012) shows how Colombian communities that suffered conflict in the past are more likely to be current hotspots of insurgency. Osorio, Schubiger & Weintraub (2016) show that in Mexico, current forms of self-defense mobilization against criminal violence can also be traced back to historical popular rebellions. Moreover, a few works highlight the importance of the 'supply-side' legacies of civil wars,

in other words, how conflicts alter the constellation of local political actors and organizations. This approach complements studies focusing on the direct effect on civilians' preferences, or the 'demand-side' of the political market, adding a new dimension to the debate on the long-term impact of civil wars on political preferences. [Bateson \(2013\)](#) explains how self-defense militias set up during the Guatemalan civil war are still active as vigilante organizations, shaping the way local communities behave politically and cope with the recent rise in criminal activity. [Costalli & Ruggeri \(2015\)](#) find that local armed bands that mobilized to fight against the Nazi in the Italian Civil War managed to become non-violent political entrepreneurs and increase electoral support for them in the post-war period. [Costalli & Ruggeri \(2018\)](#) offer further support for the supply-side argument, showing that political parties connected to armed actors enjoy a long-term organizational advantage that can be translated into electoral success. [Rizkallah \(2016\)](#) shows how the process of consolidating territorial control during the Lebanese Civil War developed the resources that would later be used to mobilize postwar electoral support.

A few recent studies do focus on the long-term, community-level effects of political violence on preferences. [Balcells \(2010a\)](#) analyzes the effects of civilian victimization in Spain, looking at the difference in violence between leftist and rightist forces and its effect in Catalan municipalities. However, she does not find conclusive results. [Fontana, Nannicini & Tabellini \(2017\)](#) find that the violent Nazi occupation of Italy during World War II increased the vote share to communist parties. [Rozenas, Schutte & Zhukov \(2017\)](#) explore the effect of Stalin's forced deportations in Ukraine in the 1940s, and show that exposed communities are less likely to vote for pro-Russian parties many decades later.

However, these works assume an average individual effect which is aggregated up to the level of communities, without accounting for how the effect of violence varies depending on the social context. The role of local organizations and relevant actors is ignored in these accounts. As highlighted above, civil wars have an impact on the supply-side of politics, and this new organizational structures also have a long-term effect on electoral behavior, as can be observed in countries such as Italy ([Costalli & Ruggeri, 2015](#)) or Lebanon ([Rizkallah, 2016](#)). These ideas resonates with those studies on electoral per-

sistence during authoritarian regimes that point to the role of organizations and social networks in explaining persistence, as in the case of Hungary ([Wittenberg, 2006](#)).

Therefore, a missing piece in the literature is the interaction between the supply-side and the demand-side in the postwar period and the way they both shape the electoral legacies of civil wars. Addressing this gap could explain why exposure to victimization has a different impact across countries or areas within the same conflict, helping to interpret null or mixed findings and to generalize beyond specific contexts. The next section offers an argument about how the long-term legacies of violence are mediated by the local social environment, speaking both to the literature on the legacies of violence and to previous studies on the role of local organizations in explaining electoral persistence.

## Theory

Previous research suggests that violence against civilians causes victimized communities to feel aggrieved, producing a long-term rejection of the perpetrator's political identity ([Balcells, 2012](#); [Lupu & Peisakhin, 2017](#); [Fontana, Nannicini & Tabellini, 2017](#); [Rozenas, Schutte & Zhukov, 2017](#)). However, evidence for this 'backfiring' effect is still limited, and we do not know how it varies, or why it would be present in some places but not in others. This argument explores the conditions under which it takes place.

I argue that such an effect does not take place directly, by merely changing attitudes of individuals exposed to violence, but is heavily mediated by the social context surrounding the individual. The creation of collective memories of the violence and its translation into political preferences is the product of political work done by social actors, helping to give a meaning to violent events, creating and maintaining memories over time, and using them to mobilize support. Without a social environment in which it is possible to discuss and develop the political meaning of violence, there would not be long-term consequences on political preferences.

This argument suggests that we have to pay attention to both the supply-side and the demand-side of the political market ([Costalli & Ruggeri, 2018](#)) to understand the legacies of civil wars. Although violent events have a direct impact on civilians' preferences, po-

litical networks play a crucial role in activating the political dimension of wartime memories and translating them into political behavior. This idea resonates with previous research on how party organization and local structures are crucial when mobilizing voters (Tavits, 2013). Moreover, this idea goes in line with previous research on political persistence, which has highlighted this type of institutional explanation, suggesting that local organizations or institutions are the vectors of transmission of political attachments over time (Wittenberg, 2006).

By political networks, I do not necessarily refer to formal organizations, but to the presence of local individuals who are politically active and provide local communities with an ideologically-based social capital that allows political discussion and basic mobilization. In the case of Francoist Spain, I refer to underground networks of left-wing activists, but the specific nature of this networks can vary depending on the context. Thus, they can stem from traditional forms of political organization, such as the working-class movement or student organizations, but they could also be found within neighbor or religious groups with a shared political ideology.

In the case of wartime memories and their effect on political preferences, my claim is that the existence of political networks plays a fundamental role in at least three aspects. These are not mutually exclusive dimensions, nor are they all necessary. Rather, they are three steps in the process between violent events and changes in political behavior where the role of political networks and actors is relevant.

First, local political networks frame wartime events and provide a political account of victimization, helping to form collective memories. Even during wartime or immediately after it, when a direct effect of violence on attitudes would be more likely, the interpretation and framing of violent events is highly dependent on the social context surrounding the individual. For instance, Shesterinina (2016: 411) shows how, during the first moments of the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992–1993, information about war-related threats spread in Abkhazia through local community leaders, and was ‘reinforced and acted on within the quotidian networks of relatives and friends.’

Civilians rely heavily on close networks and already existing frames to understand the violence and engage in blaming processes, particularly considering that people usu-

ally cope with the risk and trauma of violence collectively (Lyons et al., 1998). Social-psychological research suggests that self-perceived victimhood is usually a collective phenomenon in which social identities play a crucial role defining wartime memories (Bartal, 1997, 2007). These memories are likely to vary across and even within localities, and do not always correspond to an objective portrait of the conflict. For instance, Burrell (2013) explains how villagers in some municipalities of Guatemala cared more about which of their neighbors was responsible for the denunciation that led to their relatives' deaths than whether it was actually carried out by the guerrilla or the army. Thus, local political networks carry out an important mobilization task by providing a collective story of victimization and pointing out to those who were responsible for the violence.

Second, the existence of networks also provides a social space in which it is possible for like-minded individual to discuss politics. By engaging in constant interaction with those who share political experiences and identities, individuals develop a common understanding of past experiences of victimization and come to understand them in the language of political cleavages. Along these lines, Wittenberg (2006: 51) explains that the persistence of rightist ideology during the communist period in Hungary was due to local church institutions, noting that 'being nominally Roman Catholic (or Calvinist) mattered less for the transmission of rightist attachments than being around other Catholics (or Calvinists) in a church community.' In the context of Eastern European new democracies, Tavits (2013) argues the existence of local party branches motivates interaction between party members and supporters, increasing electoral support. Moreover, case evidence from previous research points to the importance of the social context in explaining the persistence of attitudes in the long term. For instance, Voigtländer & Voth (2012: 1341) find that anti-Semitic attitudes persisted in Germany over many centuries, but mainly in small towns with tight networks and low mobility, where collective rituals such as 'symbolic practices and festivals may have helped perpetuate hostile beliefs.'

Third, for victimization to increase electoral support for certain political parties, collective memories need to be translated into actual political behavior. Violence could have long-term effects on general political preferences, but ultimately, it is the role of actors and networks that makes people more likely to act based on wartime memories than on



other social or economic issues. As with any other form of mobilization, this is far from being an individual-based process. Previous research again suggests that mobilization is necessary for memories of victimization to be translated into specific forms of political behavior. In Greece, Fouka & Voth (2016: 4–5) link massacres by Nazi forces during the Second World War with boycotts to German car sales during the 2010–14 Euro crisis, and find that the effect is bigger in ‘areas with a history of political radicalization in the past ... [and] in areas with numerous Facebook groups dedicated to boycotting German products.’

To sum up, I argue that in those communities where political networks are active, they provide individuals with a political interpretation of wartime victimization, create collective memories based upon it, provide a social context in which it is possible to discuss and share experiences, and mobilize electoral support in the long run.

Following this discussion, I outline the two main hypotheses, which point to the base effect of rightist victimization on leftist electoral support and to the main contribution of this article, the conditional effect of local political networks.

**H1:** Wartime violence against civilians increases long-term local support for political groups in opposition to the perpetrator’s political identity.

**H2:** The long-term effect of wartime violence against civilians is stronger where political networks or organizations are present at the local level.

## **The Spanish Civil War and its aftermath**

The Spanish Civil War began after a failed coup against the Spanish Republic in July 1936, and was fought for almost three years, until April 1, 1939. The conflict mainly developed along the left-right cleavage, pitting the nationalist rebels commanded by General Francisco Franco against the republican forces, formed by army officers who remained loyal to the Republic as well as left-wing militias. The outbreak of the war was preceded by one of the most politically intense periods in the contemporary history of Spain, as social and political struggles along this division were already very present in the previous years.

## Victimization during the war

Victimization was commonly used during the civil war, in an attempt to wipe out potential enemies within the controlled territories. Following current research, more than 150,000 people died as a result of rearguard one-sided violence, of which around 100,000 took place in the territory controlled by the military rebels (Casanova, 2010). Both sides resorted to violence against civilians, but the rebels did so with the explicit goal of dismantling the Republican regime and controlling the population. When urged by foreign diplomats to bring the war to a quick end, Francisco Franco affirmed that he was 'not interested in territory but in inhabitants,' and expressed worry about ending the war too soon, before he had 'the certainty of being able to found a regime' (cited in Anderson, 2016: 10). In both sides, opportunistic or more intimate reasons played a role in shaping the violence, as when people denounced neighbors based on previous family quarrels. However, the main factor explaining victimization were political identities (Balcells, 2017).

Victimization took place in several forms. There was indirect violence in the form of bombardments, mainly by the Rebel forces against Republican areas. And there was direct violence, in which local militias would track down the local opposition, using previous political affiliations or membership in trade unions (on the nationalist side) or religious organizations (on the republican side). A common form of violent repression were the *paseos* (strolls), when the local militia would go to the victim's home, take him or her for a walk, and kill the victim extrajudicially. Finally, a relevant part of the victimization took place in the form of summary executions as a result of court-martial trials (*Consejos de Guerra*).

## Francoist regime

The rebel's victory in the civil war meant the establishment of an authoritarian regime in Spain that would last almost 40 years. Franco continued with the task he had already started in the conquered territories since 1936, setting up a reactionary regime and repressing any residual opposition that still existed within the country. The first few years

of the postwar period were especially harsh. [García Piñeiro \(2001: 104\)](#) tells how ‘leftist people did not ignore that they were always suspects, not only of political crimes, but of any other offense that someone had committed.’

In the late-1950s, internal dissent to the regime stepped up again, initially led by the student movement in Madrid and the northern miners. During these years, Spain witnessed profound social transformations and intense economic development, which partly explain the renewed internal opposition. A historical mining strike in 1962 gave rise to a new period of contentious activity, and dissent spread to many other areas of the country. In response, Francoist authorities set up in 1963 the *Tribunal de Orden Público*, a special court that prosecuted political offenses against the State or the values it represented ([Del Aguila, 2001](#)). This court would be active until 1977, when it was abolished after processing more than 30,000 cases mainly related to membership in left-wing groups or participation in political activities.

## **Transition to democracy**

In November 1975 General Franco died. Amidst strong social pressures, the most progressive sector within the regime put the country on track towards democracy. Socialist and communist parties were legalized and the first multi-party democratic elections were celebrated in 1977, more than 40 years after the outbreak of the civil war.

Electoral politics after 1977 played out along the same divisions that had defined politics during the Second Republic (1931–1936) and, although some of the prewar political organizations no longer existed, political cleavages remained unchanged from the prewar period ([Maravall, 1982](#)).

## **Empirics**

I test the argument using data from Spain. In particular, I estimate the difference-in-differences (DiD) in leftist vote share between the prewar elections of 1936 and all the 13 democratic elections since 1977, analyzing the long-term effect of Francoist violence

against civilians and how this effect varies depending on the existence of underground political networks during the late dictatorship. I also include analyses to provide evidence against two potential alternative explanations for the main results.

I build a dataset that covers 2,100 municipalities –around a fourth of all municipalities in Spain– from thirteen provinces in the regions of Galicia (Lugo), Asturias, the Basque Country (Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa, and Alava), Aragon (Huesca, Zaragoza, and Teruel), Catalonia (Lleida, Girona, Tarragona, and Barcelona) and Castilla-La Mancha (Albacete).<sup>1</sup>

Figure 1 shows the geographical coverage of the data.



**Figure 1.** Provinces included in the sample

Some of these areas were quickly conquered by the Francoist rebels, such as Lugo and western Asturias, and the war effectively ended during the first weeks without significant

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<sup>1</sup>Many municipalities experienced territorial changes during the period of analysis, including merges and segregations. The strategy to deal with these changes was to reduce the list to a ‘minimum denomination’ of municipalities to standardize all data sources across different periods. The actual number of municipalities in the 2011 census in the included provinces is 2,162. In 1930, there were 2,517.

battles. Some other provinces were the scenario of military campaigns throughout the conflict, hosting some of the most stable battlefronts of the war, such as central Asturias, Bizkaia, or the Aragon region. Finally, other regions included in the sample remained under Republican control until the last few months, which is the case in Catalonia and Albacete.

In terms of socioeconomic backgrounds, the sample also covers a wide array of variation. Lugo, western Asturias, Albacete or some parts of Aragon were deeply agrarian regions before the war, and experienced a loss of population during the economic boom of the 1960s due to rural-urban migration. Central Asturias, the Basque Country, and Catalonia were industrial centers already before the war, and during the Francoist regime they continued to develop economically and were net recipients of internal migration. Relatedly, the political context also varies largely across these regions. Agrarian provinces like Lugo were more supportive of right-wing parties before the war, and they continue to be conservative strongholds to this day. In the contrary, left-wing parties enjoyed wide support in industrial centers like Asturias and Catalonia. Although not all data is available for every province, in the appendix I show that municipalities included in the sample are very similar to those not included, at least in terms of population and post-1977 electoral results.

## **Wartime victimization**

Data on civilian victimization comes from different sources depending on the province. They include regional research projects for Lugo ([Fernández et al., 2018](#)), Asturias ([García et al., 2011](#)), and Albacete ([Ortiz Heras, 2015](#)), replication datasets for Catalonia and Aragon ([Balcells, 2010b](#)) and government data for the Basque Country ([Eusko Jaurlaritza, 2018](#)). All these databases have a high degree of internal validity, and some were created from pairing death records in the local civil registries with historical documents

and testimonies. They thus constitute a comprehensive data source of victims and their personal stories during the civil war and its aftermath.<sup>2</sup>

Using these datasets, I link municipalities to the place of residence of the victim, and restrict the list to those killed in irregular killings or executions, excluding those who died in combat. The main independent variable is a binary indicator of civilian victimization by Francoist forces—including the army, police forces, or local militias linked to the rebels—between the beginning of the civil war in 1936 until 1942, when most of the violence had already ended and which often marks the end of wartime repression (see e.g. [Payne, 2012](#): 109-110). I use a binary measure of killings in order to avoid inconsistencies between different regions, where the data sources are different, and because there is less reliability in terms of the actual number of people killed. Moreover, given that repression not only included violent killings but also other forms of non-fatal repression ([García Piñeiro, 2001](#)), using a binary indicator can work as a proxy for those municipalities that suffered other reprisals from the Francoist government. In any case, I also run a version of the models with a continuous measure of violence, namely, the log number of killings by 1000 inhabitants. [Figure 2](#) shows the geographical variation of this variable in its continuous version. The fact that violence was in many cases a local phenomenon and partly driven by the endogenous dynamics of the war ([Balcells, 2017](#)) explains why sometimes violent areas border municipalities without violence.

## Political networks after the war

The argument states that violence will only leave long-term legacies if there are active political networks that play a role in keeping those memories alive and capitalizing on them for mobilization. In the case of Spain, I argue that the relevant networks were part of the underground left-wing opposition to the dictatorship. Theoretically, these networks could also be the product of civil war violence, which would complicate empirical analyses. However, in Spain, the location of dissent during the late dictatorship was

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<sup>2</sup>The Basque data is a preliminary list part of an ongoing project, so the list could be subject to changes. Although these changes are likely to be minimal, I show in the appendix that results do not change significantly when excluding the three Basque provinces.




Figure 2. Wartime victimization by Francoist forces

independent enough from wartime dynamics, which ensures enough variation to test the argument. I provide evidence for this claim as part of the alternative explanations.

To measure the presence of underground networks of opposition, I rely on the archives of the *Tribunal de Orden Público* (TOP), a special court that prosecuted political offenses from 1963 to 1977. The sentences of this court, compiled by [Del Aguila \(2001\)](#) from the national archives, are thus a measure of opposition activity during the dictatorship.<sup>3</sup> In particular, I code a binary indicator of underground activity that measures whether there were offenses classified as ‘illegal association’ or ‘illegal propaganda’ in a given municipality or in any of its neighbors within 10km.<sup>4</sup> There are two main reasons for including this buffer area. First, it is natural to assume spill-overs of organizational activity, in the sense that political actors sentenced by the TOP would have engaged in activities beyond their municipality of residence. And second, by extending the indicator to neighboring municipalities as well, I attempt to capture latent political networks and not only political activity, trying to mitigate the bias against those networks that did not engage in more visible activities. [Figure 3](#) shows the geographical variation of this variable.

Although this data source is not perfect, it offers a good indicator of the existence of anti-regime networks during the Francoist dictatorship. The data cover the years when political opposition took off in Spain and, given the zeal with which the regime persecuted internal dissent and the capacity of the state during those years, it should capture fairly well the overall pattern of leftist dissent.

## Electoral support


Data from the February 1936 elections comes from archival sources for Lugo (the *Boletín Oficial de la Provincia*, or Official Provincial Gazette), secondary sources for Asturias ([SADEI, 1996](#)), Albacete ([Requena Gallego, 1982](#)), and Catalonia ([Vilanova, 1986](#)), replication datasets for Aragon ([Balcells, 2010b](#)), and government data for the Basque Country

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<sup>3</sup>I thank Juan José del Águila for sharing this dataset with me.


<sup>4</sup>I include in the appendix additional analyses using 5km or 20km buffers, or only marking those municipalities that had underground activity themselves.





**Figure 3.** Underground (TOP) activity between 1963–1977

(Eusko Jaurlaritza, 2016). In all cases, I code the vote share of the leftist coalition *Frente Popular* (Popular Front) in each municipality. Figure 4 maps prewar leftist support.



**Figure 4.** Leftist support in 1936

Data on electoral results between 1977 and 2016 are available online ([Ministerio del Interior, 2013](#)). To measure leftist vote, I coded the share of votes in each municipality for all the leftist parties, including both the major, country-wide parties as well as the leftist nationalist parties in the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia. I detail in the appendix which parties were included.

## Other variables

I include in every model a number of additional variables to control for both the determinants of civilian victimization and the evolution of leftist vote between the civil war and the post-1977 democratic period.

First, using census data (INE, 2018), I include the logged population in 1970 and the change in population between 1940 and 1970, to control for economic changes and rural-urban migration patterns.

Second, I include a dummy variable indicating the presence of prewar local affiliates to the two major labor unions, the anarchist *Confederacion Nacional del Trabajo* (CNT) and the socialist *Unión General de Trabajadores* (UGT), using data from Cuco-Giner (1970), Calero (2009) and the UGT archives (UGT, 1931).

Third, I control for rugged terrain and inaccessibility, which influences both patterns of victimization and subsequent sociopolitical dynamics, using the standard deviation of elevation within each municipality (Mapzen, 2018).

Finally, following Balcells (2017), I also calculate a measure of electoral competition in 1936, using the same sources described above. I also include a variable indicating the leftist vote in 1936, to control for different baselines.

## Models

I estimate difference-in-differences models of the effect of wartime victimization on leftist vote between 1936 and all the thirteen elections that took place between 1977 and 2016. I first estimate a base model that only indicates the effect of Francoist victimization on the increase of leftist support relative to 1936. To test the main argument, I include an interaction with the network variable in all subsequent models and show how the effect of victimization varies depending on the presence of these networks.

A first concern with these analyses is that the binary nature of the victimization variable could hide important variation explaining why certain municipalities, which suffered harsher violence, show a bigger increase in leftist vote. Therefore, I also run the same model using the log number of killings per 1,000 inhabitants. Second, rural-urban migration, which was an important phenomenon after the 1950s, could mean that people more likely to vote to the Left moved to cities, such as the emerging left-leaning working class. Moreover, economic repression, that took place particularly during the first years of the Francoist regime, meant that the losers of the civil war were more likely to experience

economic hardship (García Piñeiro, 2001; Cazorla-Sánchez, 2009). If these cities experienced more victimization during the civil war because of strategic reasons, results could be confounded. Thus, I also run a model excluding all municipalities that had 10,000 inhabitants or more in 1970 (around 7% of the total).

Every model includes province-level fixed effects, accounting for possible inconsistencies across different regional datasets. In addition, I include a series of robustness tests in the appendix, showing that the results do not change significantly when controlling for spatial dependency, using different specifications of the underground activity variable, or excluding the Basque provinces.<sup>5</sup>

## Endogeneity and alternative explanations

Here I try to show that there are strong reasons to think that wartime victimization caused a long-term increase in leftist vote, and that this effect is stronger in those areas where underground opposition organizations were active during the late dictatorship. However, this research design still leaves room for an obvious concern for endogeneity. In particular, two other potential explanations for the results arise.

First, when interacting wartime victimization with postwar underground activity to predict long-term leftist support, the analyses could just be capturing the effect of victimization on postwar underground activity. To account for this, I show that underground activity does not correlate with victimization patterns during the civil war.

Second, organizational persistence is another explanation for the results. In other words, areas of leftist support before the war could have been more likely to experience Francoist victimization, develop networks of opposition during the dictatorship, and support leftist parties after 1977. Obviously, organizational persistence existed to some degree, as Francoist repression was not able to wipe out leftist support completely and some areas remained leftist strongholds during the whole period. However, if this pattern is strong enough it could confound the results and invalidate my argument. My

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<sup>5</sup>A further concern with the DiD design is the parallel trends assumption. Unfortunately, an empirical test is not possible given that electoral data before 1936 is not available, but there are no strong reasons to think this assumption would be violated, particularly given the amount of time between 1936 and the first post-Franco elections.

claim is that the presence of political networks during the late dictatorship was in part a consequence of the socioeconomic dynamics of the 1950s and 1960s, and that there is enough variation with respect to patterns of prewar leftist support to provide evidence for the main argument. To test this assumption, I run a model substituting postwar clandestine activity for the presence of trade unions before the war, to rule out the possibility that the existence of prewar organizations is determining subsequent dynamics.

The key question in this article is about the conditions under which violence had long-term effects on electoral behavior and the role of underground networks in that process. This is an intrinsically endogenous process and, theoretically, both victimization and the existence of networks could take place in the same municipalities. However, without enough spatial variation, an empirical test of the argument would be very difficult. Ideally, the mechanism could be tested by linking the mobilization activities of these networks and over-time variation in both the way civilians remembered wartime violence and their political preferences. Unfortunately, such analyses would require data that is not currently available. By showing that there is enough variation and ruling out alternative explanations, I attempt to provide evidence in support of the argument that the effect of violence was mediated by the existence of political actors and networks.

## Results and discussion


### Main results

Figure 5 presents the results from the DiD models on the increase of leftist vote respective to the 1936 elections.<sup>6</sup> Model 1 tests hypothesis H1, giving a simple DiD estimate of wartime rightist victimization on the subsequent increase in leftist vote. The coefficients indicate the increase in leftist vote for each election, relative to the 1936 share, that is due to wartime Francoist violence against civilians. Supporting H1, the effect of victimization

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<sup>6</sup>Throughout this section I summarize the results graphically and include the full tables of the DiD models in the appendix.

is positive and significant during the first half of the democratic period, peaking around the mid-1980s and decreasing thereafter.<sup>7</sup>




**Figure 5.** Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase depending on the presence of political networks  
Coefficient plot for four difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown.

Turning now to hypothesis H2, Model 2 includes an interaction of the victimization variable with the existence of political networks during the late dictatorship. Results sup-

<sup>7</sup>In the appendix, I show that these results hold when comparing a model with only pre-violence variables estimated on the full sample and on two matched datasets.

port the main argument. In particular, the effect of victimization on leftist vote increase is close to zero and not significant in those cases without political networks, but it is positive and significant when these networks are present. For a better interpretation of the results, Figure 6 shows the DiD estimates, or the victimization-related increase in leftist vote share for each election respective to 1936, in municipalities with and without presence of underground political networks. The graph shows how in those municipalities where political networks had been active, victimization has a positive and significant effect, particularly during the mid-1980s through the early 2000s. Victimization does not seem to have a relevant effect in those municipalities without networks.



**Figure 6.** DiD estimate of wartime victimization on leftist vote depending on the presence of political networks

Following the points raised in the previous section, Models 3 and 4 in Figure 5 show that the results do not change when using a continuous measure of violence or when limiting the sample to small towns. In addition, I include in the appendix further robustness tests, showing that the results hold when including spatial lags for controlling for potential spill-over effects, when excluding the three Basque provinces from the sample or when using different specifications of the network variable. Moreover, I show that the results do not change when taking into account wartime leftist victimization, in those provinces where this data is available.

In brief, results suggest that wartime victimization produced an increase in leftist sympathies, particularly in those places where anti-regime networks had been active during


the dictatorship, and presumably helped to develop collective memories and mobilize support based on them. Once Spain transitioned to democracy, these sympathies translated into votes for leftist parties. The analyses show that the effect of wartime victimization is no longer statically significant after 2000, which in principle is coherent with the argument. Once democracy settled in, leftist parties became more institutionalized, new generations that had not known Franco's regime reached voting age, and other issues different from wartime memories gained in importance, which should explain why the local effect of violence became less relevant.

### **Networks as a consequence of victimization**

An alternative explanation to the results presented above is that both leftist vote increase and the presence of clandestine political activity during Francoism are the consequence of wartime victimization. Although delving into the specific causes of anti-regime network presence is outside the scope of this article, for the empirical results to be valid the presence of networks at the local level should be independent enough from wartime dynamics explaining victimization. To test this, I regress the presence of networks on wartime victimization and leftist vote in 1936, including a set of control variables similar to the ones included in the main analyses. Figure 7 shows the results using different specifications, including or not the interaction between victimization and leftist support in 1936 and with and without province fixed effects.

In every model, wartime victimization does not show any relationship with the presence of political networks during the Francoist regime. The absence of a clear link suggests that postwar political activity against the regime was the consequence of a different process, possibly related more to the social and economic dynamics of those years than to the legacies of the civil war. The positive and significant coefficient of population change between 1940 and 1960 points to one possible determinant, namely, economic and population growth, which is not related to wartime dynamics of victimization and was already controlled for in the main analyses.





**Figure 7.** Wartime victimization and postwar clandestine activity


Coefficient plot for four logistic regressions. Intercept and province FE not shown. AIC Model 5: 723.6, Model 6: 628.8, Model 7: 725.5, Model 8: 630.8. All models,  $n = 2047$ .

## Persistence of prewar organizations

Another alternative explanation is organizational persistence, in other words, that in those municipalities where the labor movement was present before the civil war leftist organizations might have survived the conflict and influenced the emergence of an anti-regime movement after the war.

This explanation is not at odds with the theory. If political organizations are resilient enough to survive violent repression during a civil war, they might be the ones that carry out the mobilization against the perpetrator in the postwar period. Some degree of persistence surely existed, but again, this empirical design requires enough spatial variation. To tease this out, I test here whether the increase in leftist vote is related to the presence of trade unions before the war. I run a version of the main models (2-4), but interacting wartime victimization with the presence of prewar trade unions. Figure 8 shows the results.

In this case, the estimates of the effect of victimization in the presence of trade unions before the war are not statistically significant in any of the different specifications and, in some cases, they even have a negative impact. Again, this suggests that the location of dissent during the late dictatorship is at least partly exogenous with respect to patterns of leftist organizational activity during or before the civil war.



**Figure 8.** Effect of wartime victimization conditional on the presence of prewar trade unions

Coefficient plot for three difference-in-difference models on leftist vote response to 1936 elections. Equivalent to Models 2-4 but changing interaction term. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown.

## Discussion and case evidence

The results above suggest that wartime victimization is linked to a long-term rejection of the perpetrator's political identity, an effect that is conditional on the existence of a facilitating social environment. In the case of Spain, victimization increased support for leftist parties mainly in those municipalities where anti-regime networks had been active during Francoism. These networks, I argue, were responsible for creating collective memories and mobilizing political support based on them. Although the analyses do not offer a direct test of the mechanism, evidence from recent historical research supports the argument on the importance and role of these political networks.

[Sevillano \(1999: 155\)](#) shows how Franco's regime managed to control internal dissent through the use of traditional methods of social control and the threat of repression, which made people retreat from public life, afraid to "give certain opinions that did not have enough public and official support." This atmosphere led to widespread demobilization, which also extended to the way the conflict was remembered:

Convinced Republicans who would have insisted that the violence had been instrumental in crushing lower-class demands for reform were repressively silenced. For many of the uncommitted it made sense to explain violent conflict as the result of private vendetta or quarrels which could be seen plausibly in personal terms. ([Richards, 2013: 98](#))

My argument states that the presence of anti-regime networks would help politicize these memories and mobilize local civilians. Indeed, [Domínguez, Somoza & Fernández \(2010\)](#) state that, over time, wartime stories began to be discussed within certain groups or communities, building a collective discourse of the war. As discussed in the theoretical framework, the presence of anti-regime networks would be crucial in this process, either because they started the conversation or because they provided a social context in which enough left-leaning people could discuss personal experiences, a similar role to the one played by Catholic churches in Hungary in maintaining rightist attitudes during Communist rule ([Wittenberg, 2006](#)). For example, [Richards \(2016: 188\)](#) tells how an émigré

from southern Spain, the son of an executed leftist mayor, compared the politicized context in Barcelona with his native village, where people “had a very superficial attitude to politics,” including in the way they interpreted the conflict.

A good example of how these anti-Francoist networks could work in a politicized area is Asturias, where industrial workers and their families lived within dense networks of neighbor groups, labour unions and leftist cultural associations. Although wartime victimization had been very intense in these areas, leftist codes of behavior remained active and enforced, and years later, ‘any form of collaboration with the dictatorship, even if they did not involve harm to anyone, meant losing the respect of colleagues and neighbors’ (Vega, 2014: 230). In this context, many young socialists and communists discovered and were inspired by the political activism of their parents. Memories of the civil war could only be activated because there was a climate of left-leaning political activism, where experiences of prewar or wartime militancy were something to be proud of, rather than a personal secret that could mean social rejection.

As an opposite account, Cazorla-Sánchez (2009) writes about different regions in Spain where there was not a critical mass of leftist survivors. He describes how in certain regions former Republican families preferred not to talk about what happened during the war, and the victims of wartime repression ‘even thought that Franco was a good man who knew nothing of the crimes, injustices, and miseries committed against people like themselves’ (Cazorla-Sánchez, 2009: 3) . Thus, in conservative areas without left-leaning networks of support, wartime memories contrary to the Francoist regime were deeply repressed by the social environment:

For example, the agrarian region of Santander had a reputation for being conservative and staunchly Catholic. Here, as in the rest of Spain, defeated republicans living under Franco could expect official prosecution and social rejection for having fought on the wrong side in the war, even from their own families. (...) Even in the early 1990s, when democracy was on a safe footing, they preferred not to talk too much. (Cazorla-Sánchez, 2009: 32–33)

All in all, I try to show here that the effect of violence is mediated by the social context, which facilitates the creation of collective memories and their translation into political preferences and behavior. In Spain, this task was carried out by anti-regime networks during Franco's dictatorship.

How do these findings travel beyond Spain? Although the importance of clandestine anti-regime networks might be specific to Spain, the main idea revolves around the need of a facilitating social environment that allows the whole process from violent events to political preferences to materialize. In other contexts, therefore, it might be important to pay attention to the role of victim's organization, political actors, or even communication technologies, to understand how collective tales of the violence are being developed and how they are being used to mold political preferences. The heated debate about memory in Guatemala and the differences in how past exposure to violence is linked to patterns of political support ([Ball, Kobrak & Spirer, 1999](#); [Burrell, 2013](#)) is an example of this. Moreover, approaching the problem of the legacies of violence from this point of view might also explain why certain contexts, such as ethnic civil wars, where there is often a sense of collectivity and clearly defined ideological boundaries, might be more prone to repeated cycles of violence and radicalization. My contribution here is highlighting the importance of the social environment, and pointing out that it might not be ideal to think of an homogenous effect of victimization across different contexts.

## Conclusion

Using extensive local-level data from Spain, I showed that rightist violence against civilians during the Spanish Civil War increased long-term support for leftist parties, but mainly in those municipalities where political networks were active after the war. Results are thus consistent with the idea that the long-term legacies of political violence for political preferences are not homogeneous across social contexts, but rather depend on the existence of a facilitating environment.

A few questions remain open. First, civil war themselves have an impact on local social networks ([Wood, 2008](#)). Violence usually targets networks of political support for

the opposition, and the militarization of local life creates and empowers new social structures (Bateson, 2013). Although one of the proposed alternative explanations deals with the persistence of organizational structures, it might be worth to explore to what extent postwar political networks are linked to their predecessors before or during the war, and how this interacts with their actions after the war. Second, for the case of Spain in particular, it is still unclear which political forces benefitted more from wartime memories and, particularly in the case of the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia, how this affected support for regional nationalist parties. The problem of cross-cutting cleavages is important as collective memories are malleable, and political networks might have the capacity to capitalize on violence-induced grievances to increase support along a different political dimension. Other contexts, such as the postwar period in Guatemala where different actors compete locally over different accounts of the conflict, suggest the importance of this struggle over memory. Future research should explore these issues.

Previous studies have identified the long-term effect of victimization on political preferences, but they have failed to provide evidence on the way this process takes place and the reasons why it should be present in some cases but not in others. Although this article uses empirical data from a single conflict, its findings clearly point to the need to understand the social context in which this long-term effect plays out, and the actors involved in the process. A more explicit focus on this would advance the literature on the consequences of political violence and improve our capacity to deal with postwar societies. Beyond pure scholarly interest, further research on this problem could inform postwar reconciliation or anti-radicalization programs worldwide.

## Replication data

The dataset, R-code and Online appendix can be found at <http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets> and at <http://franvillamil.github.io>.

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## **Biographical statement**

FRANCISCO VILLAMIL, b. 1991, PhD in Political Science (ETH Zurich, 2020).

# Online Appendix for Mobilizing memories: The social conditions of the long-term impact of victimization

Francisco Villamil

April 10, 2020

## Contents

<b>A</b>	<b>Political parties coded as leftist</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>B</b>	<b>Selection of municipalities within Spain</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>C</b>	<b>Full tables of DiD models</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>D</b>	<b>Base models and matching</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>E</b>	<b>Robustness tests</b>	<b>15</b>
E.1	Spatial Dependency . . . . .	15
E.2	Excluding the Basque Country . . . . .	15
E.3	Distance buffer in underground networks variable . . . . .	15
E.4	Leftist victimization . . . . .	18

## A Political parties coded as leftist

Table A1 shows which political parties were coded as leftist in every election after 1977. Among them, I include both major, country-wide parties such as PSOE or PCE, as well as the leftist nationalist parties in the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, such as *Euskadiko Ezkerra* (EE), *Herri Batasuna* (HB), or *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC).

**Table A1:** Political parties coded as leftist in each election

1977	PSOE, PCE, PSP, EE, EC-FED
1979	PSOE, PCE, EE, ERFN, HB, EE
1982	PSOE, PCE, EE, HB, ERC
1986	PSOE, IU, MUC, PST, PCC, AV, LV, UPR, PORE, HB, EE, ERC, PSG.EG, BNG
1989	PSOE, IU, LV.LV, LVE, PTE, PST, PCPE, LV, HB, EA, EE, ERC, BNG, PSG.EG, AV.MEC
1993	PSOE, IU, LV, LE, PST, PCPE, PEC-LV, HB, ERC, EA.EUE, ERC, BNG
1996	PSOE, IU, LV, PRT, PEC, CHA, BNG, HB, ERC, EA
2000	PSOE, IU, ICV, LV, LV-GV, PCPE, POSI, EV-AV, CHA, BNG, ERC, EA
2004	PSOE, IU, CHA, EV-AE, IR, PCPE, LV, ERC, BNG, EA, NaBai, Aralar
2008	PSOE, IU, PACMA, LV, CHA, LV-GV, EV-AE, PSD, ERC, BNG, NaBai, EA, Aralar
2011	PSOE, IU-LV, Equo, PACMA, PCPE, Anticapitalistas, Amaiur, ERC, BNG, GeBai
2015	PSOE, Podemos, En Com, IU-Unidad Popular, En Marea-Podemos, PACMA, Recordes Cero, PCPE, Por la Izquierda, ERC, EH Bildu, Ns, GeBai
2016	PSOE, En Marea-Podemos, En Com Podem, Unidos Podemos, PACMA, Recortes Cero-GV, PCPE, ERC, EH Bildu, BNG-Ns, GeBai

AV, Alternativa Verda; MEC, Moviment Ecologista de Catalunya; BNG, Bloque Nacionalista Galego; CHA, Chunta Aragonesista; EA, Eusko Alkartasuna; EUE, Euskal Ezkerra; EC-FED, Esquerra de Catalunya-Front Electoral Democrtic; EE, Euskadiko Ezkerra; ERC, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya; ERFN, Esquerra Republicana - Front Nacional; EV, Els Verds; GeBAI, Geroa Bai; HB, Herri Batasuna; ICV, Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds; IR, Izquierda Republicana; IU, Izquierda Unida; LV, Los Verdes; GV, Grupo Verde; MUC, Mesa por la Unidad de los Comunistas; NaBai, Nafarroa Bai; PACMA, Partido Animalistas contra el Maltrato Animal; PCC, Partit dels Comunistes de Catalunya; PCE, Partido Comunista Espaol; PCPE, Partido Comunista de los Pueblos de Espaa; PEC, Partit Ecologista de Catalunya; PORE, Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Espaa); POSI, Partido Obrero Socialista Internacionalista; PRT, Partido Republicano del Trabajo; PSD, Partido Socialista Democrtico; PSG.EG, Partido Socialista Galego-Esquerda Galega; PSOE, Partido Socialista Obrero Espaol; PSP, Partido Socialista Popular; PST, Partido Socialista del Trabajo; PTE, Partido de los Trabajadores de Espaa; UPR, Unidad Popular Republicana.

## B Selection of municipalities within Spain

The analyses in the main text uses data from slightly over 2,000 municipalities, which correspond to roughly a quarter of all municipalities in Spain, covering 13 provinces out of a total of 50 provinces (plus two autonomous cities). This sample responds to issues of data availability and, in principle, the sample offers a wide range of variation in terms of social, political and economic differences. An open question however is whether we can expect that these 2,000+ municipalities are a good representation of the full Spanish territory.

Although most data used in the main analyses is not available for all municipalities, I compare here the municipalities in the sample with the rest, using two datasets that are available for the whole country: population data and electoral results after 1977.

Figure A1 shows the population in 1940 for all municipalities, displaying those included in the sample along with those in provinces not covered by the dataset. The average population in the municipalities in the sample is 2963, in those out of the sample is 3079. Although the difference between both distributions (when using the logged population) is statistically significant, mainly because of the sample size, the magnitude is minimal. Figure A2 shows the change in population between 1940 and 1970 between municipalities in and out of the sample. Again, although municipalities in the sample experienced more population growth, the differences are not large: the coefficient for being out of sample in a linear regression of population change is -0.097.






Figure A1: Population in 1940

Turning to electoral data, figure A3 shows the share of vote to leftist parties (see table A1) in all municipalities in and out of the sample, across all the elections since 1977. Municipalities in the sample are slightly more leftist, but in this case the difference is even smaller: the coefficient term for being out of sample on leftist vote share is just -0.001.






**Figure A2:** Population change 1940–1970




**Figure A3:** Municipality-level vote share to leftist parties since 1977

Figure A4 shows the evolution in the average vote share to leftist parties in each province across all elections. Again, the graph suggests that there are no large differences between those provinces included in the sample and those that are not. Perhaps the biggest outliers are found in the Basque Country (see figure A5), but in any case, in the last section of this appendix the main results are replicated excluding the three Basque provinces from the sample (see section E.2).

All in all, although this is not definite evidence, comparing municipalities in and out of the sample based on population data and electoral results after 1977 suggests that the provinces included in the sample do represent well the whole territory of Spain. As argued in the main text, we should not expect any significant biases when extrapolating the results to the whole country.



**Figure A4:** Mean vote share to leftist parties in each province



**Figure A5:** Mean vote share to leftist parties in each province

## C Full tables of DiD models

Table [A2a](#) (continued in tables [A2b](#) and [A2c](#)) shows the full results of the main models displayed graphically in the main text, corresponding to models 1-4.

Similarly, [A3a](#) (continued in [A3b](#) and [A3c](#)) shows the full results of models 9-11, which correspond to the analyses of the organizational persistence alternative explanation.

**Table A2a:** Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.162*** (0.009)	0.144*** (0.010)	0.141*** (0.010)	0.130*** (0.011)
Election 1977	-0.109*** (0.006)	-0.104*** (0.009)	-0.107*** (0.008)	-0.104*** (0.009)
Election 1979	-0.059*** (0.006)	-0.069*** (0.009)	-0.061*** (0.008)	-0.070*** (0.009)
Election 1982	-0.012* (0.006)	0.009 (0.009)	0.014+ (0.008)	0.008 (0.009)
Election 1986	-0.009 (0.006)	0.034*** (0.009)	0.036*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.009)
Election 1989	0.017** (0.006)	0.062*** (0.009)	0.067*** (0.008)	0.062*** (0.009)
Election 1993	0.054*** (0.006)	0.069*** (0.009)	0.075*** (0.008)	0.069*** (0.009)
Election 1996	0.048*** (0.006)	0.096*** (0.009)	0.097*** (0.008)	0.096*** (0.009)
Election 2000	-0.018** (0.006)	0.033*** (0.009)	0.033*** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.009)
Election 2004	0.117*** (0.006)	0.137*** (0.009)	0.136*** (0.008)	0.137*** (0.009)
Election 2008	0.114*** (0.006)	0.142*** (0.009)	0.142*** (0.008)	0.142*** (0.009)
Election 2011	0.017** (0.006)	0.047*** (0.009)	0.043*** (0.008)	0.047*** (0.009)
Election 2015	0.123*** (0.006)	0.128*** (0.009)	0.128*** (0.008)	0.129*** (0.009)
Election 2016	0.135*** (0.006)	0.124*** (0.009)	0.122*** (0.008)	0.124*** (0.009)
Wartime victimization	-0.008 (0.006)	0.012 (0.009)	0.002 (0.005)	0.009 (0.009)
Networks (TOP activity)		0.031*** (0.009)	0.019* (0.008)	0.031*** (0.009)
Change pop 1940-70	0.029*** (0.001)	0.029*** (0.001)	0.029*** (0.001)	0.037*** (0.002)
Log. Population 1970	0.015*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.001)	0.017*** (0.001)	0.018*** (0.001)
Unions (CNT)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.003)
Unions (UGT)	-0.034*** (0.004)	-0.034*** (0.004)	-0.035*** (0.004)	0.0005 (0.006)
Leftist vote 1936	0.254*** (0.005)	0.253*** (0.005)	0.253*** (0.005)	0.245*** (0.006)
Elec. competition 1936	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.010* (0.004)
Terrain ruggedness	0.00004*** (0.00001)	0.00004*** (0.00001)	0.00003*** (0.00001)	0.00004*** (0.00001)
(...)				

**Table A2b: Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase (cont)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(...)				
1977 x Victimization	0.012 (0.008)	-0.018 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.019 (0.013)
1979 x Victimization	0.028*** (0.008)	0.011 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.011 (0.013)
1982 x Victimization	0.039*** (0.008)	0.014 (0.013)	0.002 (0.008)	0.013 (0.013)
1986 x Victimization	0.042*** (0.008)	0.006 (0.013)	0.001 (0.008)	0.006 (0.013)
1989 x Victimization	0.044*** (0.008)	0.001 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.0001 (0.013)
1993 x Victimization	0.028*** (0.008)	0.008 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.007 (0.013)
1996 x Victimization	0.023** (0.008)	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.014 (0.013)
2000 x Victimization	0.013 (0.008)	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.018 (0.013)
2004 x Victimization	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.016 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.017 (0.013)
2008 x Victimization	0.003 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.013)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.013)
2011 x Victimization	-0.00003 (0.008)	-0.021 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.021 (0.013)
2015 x Victimization	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.016 (0.013)
2016 x Victimization	-0.013 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.013)
1977 x TOP		-0.010 (0.012)	0.004 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.012)
1979 x TOP		0.019 (0.012)	0.031** (0.011)	0.018 (0.012)
1982 x TOP		-0.038** (0.012)	-0.030** (0.011)	-0.039** (0.012)
1986 x TOP		-0.077*** (0.012)	-0.063*** (0.011)	-0.078*** (0.012)
1989 x TOP		-0.081*** (0.012)	-0.068*** (0.011)	-0.082*** (0.012)
1993 x TOP		-0.026* (0.012)	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.027* (0.012)
1996 x TOP		-0.086*** (0.012)	-0.075*** (0.011)	-0.087*** (0.012)
2000 x TOP		-0.091*** (0.012)	-0.086*** (0.011)	-0.092*** (0.012)
2004 x TOP		-0.036** (0.012)	-0.037*** (0.011)	-0.037** (0.012)
2008 x TOP		-0.050*** (0.012)	-0.048*** (0.011)	-0.051*** (0.012)
(...)				

**Table A2c: Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase (cont)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(...)				
2011 x TOP		-0.053*** (0.012)	-0.047*** (0.011)	-0.054*** (0.012)
2015 x TOP		-0.010 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.012)
2016 x TOP		0.021 <sup>+</sup> (0.012)	0.027* (0.011)	0.020 (0.012)
Victimization x TOP		-0.035** (0.012)	-0.012 <sup>+</sup> (0.007)	-0.034** (0.012)
1977 x Vict. x TOP		0.045** (0.016)	0.017 <sup>+</sup> (0.010)	0.035* (0.017)
1979 x Vict. x TOP		0.021 (0.016)	0.004 (0.010)	0.011 (0.017)
1982 x Vict. x TOP		0.044** (0.017)	0.026** (0.010)	0.038* (0.017)
1986 x Vict. x TOP		0.066*** (0.016)	0.036*** (0.010)	0.061*** (0.017)
1989 x Vict. x TOP		0.078*** (0.016)	0.046*** (0.010)	0.074*** (0.017)
1993 x Vict. x TOP		0.034* (0.016)	0.017 <sup>+</sup> (0.010)	0.034* (0.017)
1996 x Vict. x TOP		0.068*** (0.016)	0.040*** (0.010)	0.069*** (0.017)
2000 x Vict. x TOP		0.061*** (0.016)	0.040*** (0.010)	0.066*** (0.017)
2004 x Vict. x TOP		0.024 (0.016)	0.019 <sup>+</sup> (0.010)	0.032 <sup>+</sup> (0.017)
2008 x Vict. x TOP		0.027 (0.016)	0.018 <sup>+</sup> (0.010)	0.034* (0.017)
2011 x Vict. x TOP		0.040* (0.016)	0.021* (0.010)	0.046** (0.017)
2015 x Vict. x TOP		0.018 (0.016)	0.006 (0.010)	0.024 (0.017)
2016 x Vict. x TOP		-0.005 (0.016)	-0.013 (0.010)	0.002 (0.017)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>n</i>	28,626	28,626	28,626	26,666
R <sup>2</sup>	0.403	0.410	0.410	0.398
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.402	0.408	0.408	0.397

**Note:** + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Results for difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections, corresponding to models 1-4 shown in the main text. Models 2-4 include an interaction with the network variable, which in every model refers to TOP activity in the same municipality or its neighbors within 10km. Model 3 includes the wartime victimization variable in its continuous form (log. killings / 1,000 inhabitants), while Model 4 restricts the sample to town below 10,000 inhabitants. Province FE not shown.

**Table A3a: Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	0.172*** (0.009)	0.162*** (0.009)	0.150*** (0.010)
Election 1977	-0.114*** (0.006)	-0.110*** (0.006)	-0.115*** (0.006)
Election 1979	-0.063*** (0.006)	-0.049*** (0.006)	-0.064*** (0.006)
Election 1982	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.017** (0.006)
Election 1986	-0.012+ (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.013* (0.006)
Election 1989	0.015* (0.006)	0.026*** (0.006)	0.014* (0.006)
Election 1993	0.054*** (0.006)	0.065*** (0.006)	0.053*** (0.006)
Election 1996	0.047*** (0.006)	0.054*** (0.006)	0.047*** (0.006)
Election 2000	-0.019** (0.006)	-0.016** (0.006)	-0.019** (0.006)
Election 2004	0.117*** (0.006)	0.117*** (0.006)	0.117*** (0.006)
Election 2008	0.114*** (0.006)	0.116*** (0.006)	0.114*** (0.006)
Election 2011	0.017** (0.006)	0.020*** (0.006)	0.017** (0.006)
Election 2015	0.124*** (0.006)	0.128*** (0.006)	0.124*** (0.006)
Election 2016	0.137*** (0.006)	0.141*** (0.006)	0.137*** (0.006)
Wartime victimization	-0.011+ (0.006)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.014* (0.006)
Trade Unions	0.006 (0.019)	0.017 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.020)
Change pop 1940-70	0.030*** (0.001)	0.029*** (0.001)	0.036*** (0.002)
Log. Population 1970	0.014*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.001)	0.018*** (0.001)
Networks (TOP activity)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)
Leftist vote 1936	0.252*** (0.005)	0.253*** (0.005)	0.245*** (0.006)
Elec. competition 1936	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.009* (0.004)
Terrain ruggedness	0.00003*** (0.00001)	0.00003*** (0.00001)	0.00004*** (0.00001)
(...)			

**Table A3b: Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase (cont)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(...)			
1977 x Victimization	0.010 (0.009)	0.002 (0.005)	0.006 (0.009)
1979 x Victimization	0.027** (0.009)	0.0004 (0.005)	0.023** (0.009)
1982 x Victimization	0.040*** (0.009)	0.017** (0.005)	0.037*** (0.009)
1986 x Victimization	0.043*** (0.009)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.041*** (0.009)
1989 x Victimization	0.047*** (0.009)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.044*** (0.009)
1993 x Victimization	0.034*** (0.009)	0.009+ (0.005)	0.032*** (0.009)
1996 x Victimization	0.030*** (0.009)	0.012* (0.005)	0.028** (0.009)
2000 x Victimization	0.021* (0.009)	0.012* (0.005)	0.021* (0.009)
2004 x Victimization	0.004 (0.009)	0.003 (0.005)	0.005 (0.009)
2008 x Victimization	0.012 (0.009)	0.006 (0.005)	0.012 (0.009)
2011 x Victimization	0.010 (0.009)	0.004 (0.005)	0.010 (0.009)
2015 x Victimization	0.005 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.006 (0.009)
2016 x Victimization	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.009)
1977 x Unions	0.091*** (0.027)	0.059*** (0.018)	0.090** (0.028)
1979 x Unions	0.078** (0.027)	0.070*** (0.018)	0.079** (0.028)
1982 x Unions	0.077** (0.027)	0.040* (0.018)	0.079** (0.028)
1986 x Unions	0.056* (0.027)	0.028 (0.018)	0.060* (0.028)
1989 x Unions	0.039 (0.027)	0.017 (0.018)	0.043 (0.028)
1993 x Unions	0.014 (0.027)	0.005 (0.018)	0.019 (0.028)
1996 x Unions	0.020 (0.027)	-0.011 (0.018)	0.023 (0.028)
2000 x Unions	0.020 (0.027)	-0.023 (0.018)	0.024 (0.028)
2004 x Unions	0.00004 (0.027)	-0.029 (0.018)	0.003 (0.028)
2008 x Unions	-0.002 (0.027)	-0.027 (0.018)	0.002 (0.028)
(...)			

**Table A3c: Wartime victimization and leftist vote increase (cont)**

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(...)			
2011 x Unions	-0.009 (0.027)	-0.041* (0.018)	-0.004 (0.028)
2015 x Unions	-0.028 (0.027)	-0.035* (0.018)	-0.024 (0.028)
2016 x Unions	-0.042 (0.027)	-0.033+ (0.018)	-0.039 (0.028)
Victimization x Unions	0.016 (0.021)	-0.0003 (0.010)	0.043+ (0.023)
1977 x Vict. x Unions	-0.059* (0.030)	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.084** (0.032)
1979 x Vict. x Unions	-0.053+ (0.030)	-0.025+ (0.013)	-0.077* (0.032)
1982 x Vict. x Unions	-0.060* (0.030)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.070* (0.032)
1986 x Vict. x Unions	-0.048 (0.030)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.059+ (0.032)
1989 x Vict. x Unions	-0.044 (0.030)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.059+ (0.032)
1993 x Vict. x Unions	-0.037 (0.030)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.050 (0.032)
1996 x Vict. x Unions	-0.044 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.049 (0.032)
2000 x Vict. x Unions	-0.052+ (0.030)	0.0005 (0.013)	-0.047 (0.032)
2004 x Vict. x Unions	-0.040 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.013)	-0.033 (0.032)
2008 x Vict. x Unions	-0.038 (0.030)	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.033 (0.032)
2011 x Vict. x Unions	-0.040 (0.030)	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.046 (0.032)
2015 x Vict. x Unions	-0.023 (0.030)	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.031 (0.032)
2016 x Vict. x Unions	-0.011 (0.030)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.019 (0.032)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>n</i>	28,626	28,626	26,666
R <sup>2</sup>	0.405	0.405	0.394
Adj R <sup>2</sup>	0.404	0.403	0.392

**Note:** + $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Results for difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections, conditional on the existence of prewar trade unions, corresponding to models 9-11 shown in the main text. Second column includes the wartime victimization variable in its continuous form (log. killings / 1,000 inhabitants), while the third column restricts the sample to town below 10,000 inhabitants. Province FE not shown.



## D Base models and matching


A potential problem with the results shown in the main text is that the distribution of violence could be related to the subsequent evolution of leftist vote. In other words, the allocation of the treatment might not be independent from the outcome. To some extent, this is a valid concern: violence during the Spanish Civil War had a strong ideological dimension. However, I argue that because of the bottom-up nature of victimization patterns during the civil war, the way violence evolved endogenously during the conflict, and the relatively exogenous distribution of territorial control (Balcells, 2017), there should be enough variation in terms of exposure to violence to credibly support the argument. Moreover, rather than the plain effect of violence, the focus of this article is on the mediating effect of postwar underground activity and the conditions under which a long-term effect of violence is possible.

Because of the focus on this post-treatment variable, it would not be ideal to apply matching techniques or other statistical methods of causal inference that attempt to model the probability of being assigned into treatment based on pre-treatment variables. In other words, matching on pre-violence variable would not attain balance on the variable of interest. Despite this, as an additional test, I estimate here a matched difference-in-differences (MDID) (Abadie, 2005) on the base model without the main interaction with the network variable (model 1 in the main text) and including only prewar control variables: leftist support in 1936, electoral competition in 1936, log. population in 1930, presence of prewar trade unions, and terrain ruggedness. This design follows recent works that also attempt to measure the local-level effect of violence on different outcomes (Barceló, 2018; Carrasco, Durán-Bustamante & others, 2018). The goal of these analyses is to test the robustness of the base model to a more conservative inferential method, checking that using a matching design does not fundamentally alter the base effect of violence.

In particular, I run three models using the complete sample and two matched datasets using two standard methods: nearest neighbor with replacement and coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Ho, Imai, King & Stuart, 2007; Iacus, King & Porro, 2012). Figure A6 shows the results, and table A4 shows the balance statistics of the matched datasets, including the improvement of each matching method in terms of the difference in means between the control and treatment groups, and results of a t-test between the distribution of each variable in the control and treatment groups.

The goal of these analyses is to test the robustness of the base model to a more conservative inferential method. Again, victimization during the civil war is linked to an increase in leftist vote during the first half of the democratic period in Spain, particu-

larly during the mid-1980s. Although selecting on observables still has limitations, results show here that the basic result on the effect of victimization, without the network interaction, holds when estimating the model on a matched dataset.



**Figure A6: Base model and matching**

Coefficient plot for three difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections, equivalent to model 1 in main text. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown. Using only prewar variables as controls and for matching.

**Table A4: Balance statistics matching**

All data						
Treated = 1158, Control = 888						
	Mean Tr	Mean C	Diff			
Distance	0.66	0.44	0.23			
Leftist support 1936	0.40	0.37	0.04			
Competition 1936	0.79	0.73	0.05			
Log Population 1930	7.52	6.57	0.95			
Trade unions	0.21	0.05	0.16			
Ruggedness	102.71	112.52	-9.81			
Matched data (nearest neighbor)						
Treated = 1158, Control = 433						
	Mean Tr	Mean C	Diff	% Improv.	T-test	P-value
Distance	0.66	0.66	0.00	99.57	0.08	0.93
Leftist support 1936	0.40	0.39	0.01	65.51	1.01	0.31
Competition 1936	0.79	0.77	0.02	64.80	1.27	0.20
Log Population 1930	7.52	7.47	0.05	94.49	0.89	0.38
Trade unions	0.21	0.16	0.06	64.88	2.50	0.01
Ruggedness	102.71	90.22	12.49	-27.33	2.76	0.01
Matched data (coarsened exact matching)						
Treated = 717, Control = 644						
	Mean Tr	Mean C	Diff	% Improv.	T-test	P-value
Distance	0.57	0.56	0.02	92.54	1.63	0.10
Leftist support 1936	0.37	0.38	-0.00	94.27	-0.19	0.85
Competition 1936	0.79	0.79	0.00	96.72	0.12	0.90
Log Population 1930	7.02	6.95	0.06	93.60	1.52	0.13
Trade unions	0.07	0.07	0.00	100.00	-0.00	1.00
Ruggedness	79.97	82.29	-2.32	76.35	-0.73	0.47

## E Robustness tests

### E.1 Spatial Dependency

Another source of concern for the main results is spatial dependency among neighboring municipalities. In other words, the increase in leftist vote in a given municipality could be due to the exposure to victimization in a neighboring municipality, either because people learn of violence in nearby areas and react in the same way as if it had taken place in their own territory, or because the exposed population experience a change in preferences and this outcome affects nearby municipalities.

Accounting for this problem, figure A7 replicates the main result (model 2 in main text) including a spatial lag of violence across three different specifications: controlling for the existence of victimization in contiguous municipalities, and neighboring municipalities (model A4) within 5km (model A5) and 10km (model A6). The distance-based specifications refers to the minimum distance between borders.


Figure A7 shows that the results are identical when including the spatial lags, which suggests that spatial dependency or spill-over effects should not be a concern when interpreting the results.

### E.2 Excluding the Basque Country

Figure A8 shows the results of replicating the main analyses testing hypothesis H2 (models 2-4 in main text) but excluding all municipalities from the three Basque provinces (Bizkaia, Alava, and Gipuzkoa). The reason for doing this is that the victimization data for the Basque Country is a preliminary list and thus subject to changes, although they are likely to be minimal. Moreover, the main mediator variable, the indicator of underground opposition activity, might work differently in the Basque Country because of the probable higher repressive activity due to the existence of violent terrorism in the Basque region during the late Francoism. In any case, the three models in figure A8 show that the results excluding the Basque Country are essentially similar to the full sample and, if anything, evidence for the main argument is stronger.


### E.3 Distance buffer in underground networks variable

Figure A9 shows the results of estimating model 2 in main text using different specifications of the network variable. In particular, models A7–A9 use, respectively, an indicator of network activity in the municipality or in neighbors within 5km, within 10km, or re-



**Figure A7:** Coefficient plot for main results, controlling for spatial dependency

Coefficient plot for three difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections, equivalent to model 2 in main text, including a spatial lag of violence. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown.




**Figure A8:** Coefficient plot for main results, excluding Basque Country

Coefficient plot for three difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections, equivalent to models 2-4 in main text. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown.

moving the neighbor condition. Results are again similar to the main model, with the exception of model A12, in which the network variable only indicates network activity in the same municipality. This result suggests that the effect of underground activity extended to municipalities in the immediately surrounding areas. Interestingly, when included a limited version of the network variable (i.e. only in the municipalities where there was such activity), the effect of the existence of networks in municipalities without victimization is positive which, together with the absence of a significant interaction, suggests that in municipalities where opposition networks originated there was an increase in leftist vote irrespectively of wartime victimization.

#### **E.4 Leftist victimization**


Finally, figure [A10](#) estimates models that take into account leftist victimization, using data from those provinces where data on victimization by Republican forces is available (the analyses exclude Lugo, Albacete, Bizkaia, Alava, and Gipuzkoa). Model A13 and A14 include leftist victimization as a control variable, using a binary and a continuous (log. killings per 1,000 population) version, respectively. Results do not change from the ones in the main text. Model A15 uses leftist victimization as the main victimization variable in the interaction, as a sort of placebo analyses. If results were similar to those using rightist victimization, it would either provide support for the alternative explanation on organizational persistence, or suggest another confounding problem. However, leftist victimization does not show any significant effect.



**Figure A9:** Coefficient plot for main results, different networks specifications

Coefficient plot for three difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown.





**Figure A10:** Coefficient plot for main results, accounting for leftist victimization

Coefficient plot for three difference-in-difference models on leftist vote respective to 1936 elections. Election effects, coefficients for control variables and province FE not shown.

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