Online Appendix:

Rally 'round the barrack: Far-right support and the military

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Contents

A Descriptives (survey analyses)

Table A1 shows descriptive statistics for the survey data. Figure A1 shows the distribution of individuals in the military by self-reported ideology.

Table A1: Survey data descriptive statistics

	Unique (#)	Missing (%)	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max
Vote VOX	2	0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	1.0
Military	2	0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	1.0
Ideology (left-right)	11	14	4.6	2.0	1.0	5.0	10.0
Gender (female)	2	0	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0	1.0
Age	82	0	50.9	17.7	18.0	50.0	98.0
Education level	7	0	3.1	1.6	0.0	3.0	5.0
Employed	2	0	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.0	1.0
Unemployed	2	0	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	1.0
Religious	2	0	0.7	0.5	0.0	1.0	1.0



Figure A1: Variation in left-right positions of military & non-military personnel

B Full table (survey analyses)

Table A2: Individual-level analyses on VOX support

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	-2.282***	-2.189***	-5.835***	-5.837***
	(0.028)	(0.089)	(0.102)	(0.102)
Military	1.620***	1.282***	0.939***	1.004**
	(0.104)	(0.094)	(0.098)	(0.363)
Gender (female)		-0.804***	-0.799***	-0.799***
		(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Age		-0.018***	-0.020***	-0.020***
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education level		-0.006	0.007	0.007
		(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Employed		0.422***	0.572***	0.572***
		(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Unemployed		0.264***	0.531***	0.531***
		(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Religious		1.055***	0.302***	0.302***
		(0.032)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Ideology (left-right)			0.722***	0.722***
			(0.018)	(0.018)
Military × Ideology				-0.010
				(0.055)
n	142703	142233	122776	122776
AIC	50303.1	47704.5	33926.3	33928.2
Survey FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: + p $<$ 0.1, * p $<$ 0.05, ** p $<$ 0.01, *** p $<$ 0.001. All models include survey-clustered SE.

C Results by gender (survey analyses)

Table A3 shows the main individual-level results but excluding the sample to men, while Table A4 does the same but excluding the sample to women.

According to a report published by the Spanish Ministry of Defense (Ministerio de Defensa, 2020), 7.8% of active military personnel are women and the average age of these individuals is 43.6. Our sample of military personnel has a similar mean age (45.7). Military women are, however, over-represented in our sample equating tom 20.1%. However, given that the data shows that women are significantly *less* likely to vote for VOX, and that the effect of being in the military is lower for women as well, our sample imbalance means that we are likely to be underestimating the civil-military gap in the main analyses.

Table A3: Individual-level analyses on VOX support, men subsample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	-1.967***	-2.090***	-5.828***	-5.833***
	(0.037)	(0.134)	(0.163)	(0.160)
Military	1.458***	1.286***	0.959***	1.124**
	(0.092)	(0.096)	(0.101)	(0.374)
Age		-0.018***	-0.020***	-0.020***
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education level		-0.014	0.000	0.000
		(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Employed		0.454***	0.598***	0.598***
		(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Unemployed		0.125*	0.385***	0.386***
		(0.062)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Religious		0.984***	0.237***	0.237***
		(0.035)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Ideology (left-right)			0.733***	0.734***
			(0.020)	(0.020)
Military × Ideology				-0.025
				(0.057)
n	69106	68874	61354	61354
AIC	30847.7	29679.3	21196.6	21198.5
Survey FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All models include survey-clustered SE.

Table A4: Individual-level analyses on VOX support, women subsample

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	-2.690***	-3.254***	-6.681***	-6.678***
	(0.046)	(0.172)	(0.152)	(0.156)
Military	1.155**	1.212***	0.777*	0.414
	(0.373)	(0.336)	(0.347)	(0.957)
Age		-0.017***	-0.022***	-0.022***
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education level		0.015	0.015	0.015
		(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Employed		0.339***	0.507***	0.507***
		(0.059)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Unemployed		0.414***	0.675***	0.675***
		(0.079)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Religious		1.251***	0.483***	0.483***
		(0.069)	(0.086)	(0.086)
Ideology (left-right)			0.707***	0.706***
			(0.020)	(0.020)
Military $\times$ Ideology				0.049
				(0.135)
n	73597	73359	61422	61422
AIC	18681.6	18075.8	12823.0	12824.9
Survey FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. All models include survey-clustered SE.

D Electoral trends over time (survey analyses)

In this section we look into electoral trends over time, both for VOX and PP. First, in Figure A2, we test for temporal variation in support for VOX amongst military personnel and civilians, looking at the mean support for each of these groups in all surveys we have data on.



Figure A2: Temporal trends in support for VOX

Next, we explore how the gap in electoral support between individuals in the military and civilians emerged, and whether we can observe similar patterns for the mainstream, right-wing party, People's Party (*Partido Popular*, PP). As we mention in the main text, one of the key events that might have driven recent support for the far-right among the military was the 2017 Catalan crisis. However, VOX only became a relevant party in late 2018, partly as a consequence of these events, when it unexpectedly won more than 10% of the vote in regional elections in Andalusia and achieved institutional representation for the first time. We therefore are interested in how a potential civil-military gap in support for PP changed as a result of these two events, namely, a)

the late 2017 Catalan crisis and b) the emergence of VOX as a nationally relevant party in late 2018.

Table A5 shows results for analyses going back in time on electoral support for the mainstream, right-wing party PP. The analyses replicate the main analyses on support for VOX but changing the outcome and the sample used. In this case, we used three subsamples using monthly barometer from three periods: 1) from October 2016 to September 2017, that is, before the Catalan referendum and unilateral declaration of independence in October 2017; 2) from October 2017 to November 2018, that is, the post-Catalan crisis period when VOX was still not a relevant party in national politics, and 3) after the Andalusian regional elections in early December 2018, when VOX unexpectedly won above 10% of the votes (and gained parliamentary representation for the first time), becoming a relevant national party thereafter. Interestingly, the gap in support for PP was positive but non-significant in the first two periods, and turns negative after the emergence of VOX. Considering this models control for a series of covariates, this last finding again supports the idea that there is a special ideological affinity between the far-right and the military, particularly among conservative individuals.

Finally, we run a set of models that look into more detailed time trends, both for PP and VOX. In particular, Figure A3 shows how the effect of being in the military on support for PP and VOX changes over time.[1] Each point corresponds to a model run on data for a single quarter including the same set of control variables.

The results clearly show how, although there was not a statistically significant gap in electoral support for PP between individuals in the military and civilians before late 2018, this gap appears after the last quarter of 2018. In particular, military personnel are less likely than civilians to support PP but more likely to support VOX. Again, this suggests that being in the military makes individuals significantly more likely to support far-right parties, at least or especially when this individuals share similar ideological, social, and economic traits.

[1] In the case of VOX, we start at 2018 Q4. Before that point, support for VOX does not even reach 1%, mainly because it was not even included as one of the options in the survey question.

Table A5: Individual-level analyses on PP support, 2016–2019

	Pre Catalonia	Oct 17 - Nov 18	Post Andalucia
	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	-8.981***	-8.871***	-8.420***
	(0.285)	(0.378)	(0.181)
Military	-0.243	-0.100	-0.509**
	(0.266)	(0.267)	(0.184)
Ideology (left-right)	1.082***	1.015***	0.736***
	(0.020)	(0.036)	(0.014)
Gender (female)	-0.108*	-0.048	0.108***
	(0.052)	(0.043)	(0.029)
Age	0.020***	0.017***	0.020***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education level	0.037	-0.043*	0.031
	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.022)
Employed	-0.082	-0.144*	-0.280***
	(0.077)	(0.064)	(0.032)
Unemployed	-0.282***	-0.202***	-0.324***
	(0.081)	(0.049)	(0.034)
Religious	0.975***	0.945***	0.942***
	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.090)
n	19534	26973	71699
AIC	10929.1	14055.1	33181.4
Survey FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. All models include survey-clustered SE. The three models are run on subsamples including all surveys run before the Catalan referendum and unilateral declaration of independence in October 2017 (1), between this moment and the unexpected result of VOX in the Andalusia regional elections in December 2018 (2), and after it (3).



Figure A3: Civil-military gap in support for PP and VOX, by quarter

E Descriptives (local-level analyses)

Table A6 shows descriptive statistics of the local-level dataset. Figure A4 shows the income distribution of census sections with and without military facilities throughout Spain (left panel), and only within cities over 50,000 inhabitants (right panel).

Table A6: Local-level data descriptive statistics

	Unique (#)	Missing (%)	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max
Military facility	3	0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	1.0
VOX support, April 2019	24456	0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.5
Turnout, April 2019	28158	0	0.7	0.1	0.0	0.8	1.0
Log. Population, 2017	2935	0	7.0	0.6	4.9	7.1	8.2
Log. Household income, 2019	20872	3	10.2	0.4	8.2	10.2	11.4
Log. Municipal Pop, 2017	3394	0	10.6	2.6	4.9	10.8	15.0
Military region HQ	2	0	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.0



(a) Full sample **(b)** Only cities >50k hab.

Figure A4: Sections with military facilities and household income

F Full tables (local-level analyses)

Table A7: Support for VOX and military presence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(Intercept)	-0.227^{***}	-0.291^{***}	-0.781^{***}	-0.348^{***}	-0.738^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.017)
Military facility	0.040^{***}	0.037^{***}	0.034^{***}	0.038^{***}	0.040^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Turnout (Apr 2019)	0.001	0.015^{***}	-0.114^{***}	-0.157^{***}	-0.144^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.009)
(Log) Population	0.006^{***}	0.009^{***}	0.003^{***}	-0.004^{***}	0.004^{***}
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(Log) Household income	0.001^{***}	-0.001^{***}	0.017^{***}	-0.034^{***}	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.000)
(Log) Municipality pop.	0.023^{***}	0.030^{***}	0.080^{***}	0.104^{***}	0.084^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Military region HQ	-0.014^{***}	-0.009^{***}	-0.057^{***}		-0.010^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)		(0.001)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	33,905	20,181	10,064	5,893	8,477
R^2	0.614	0.667	0.694	0.731	0.816
Adjusted R^2	0.613	0.666	0.693	0.730	0.815

Note: $+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001$. Models 1 includes full sample. Model 2 includes only sections within 20km of military facilities. Model 3 includes only municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants in 2017. Model 4 only includes municipalities that were HQ of main military regions. Model 5 restricts the sample to the wealthiest sections ($> q3$).

Table A8: Support for VOX and nearby military presence

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	-0.221^{***}	-0.224^{***}	-0.241^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Military in contiguous section	0.016^{***}		
	(0.001)		
Military within 2km		0.007^{***}	
		(0.001)	
Inverse logged distance (m)			0.196^{***}
			(0.017)
Turnout	0.002	0.001	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
(Log) Population	0.006^{***}	0.007^{***}	0.007^{***}
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
(Log) HH Income	0.001^{***}	0.001^{***}	0.000^{+}
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
(Log) Municipality population	0.022^{***}	0.022^{***}	0.022^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Military region HQ	-0.014^{***}	-0.016^{***}	-0.016^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	33,769	33,769	33,769
R^2	0.616	0.615	0.615
Adjusted R^2	0.615	0.614	0.615

Note: $+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001$. All models exclude census sections with army facilities from the sample.

Table A9: Support for VOX and nearby military presence

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	-0.211^{***}	-0.180^{***}	0.533^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.034)
Military in contiguous section	-0.250^{***}		
	(0.026)		
Military within 2km		-0.309^{***}	
		(0.015)	
Inverse logged distance (m)			-6.712^{***}
			(0.301)
(Log) Household income	0.021^{***}	0.018^{***}	-0.053^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Contiguous $\times$ Income	0.026^{***}		
	(0.003)		
Within 2km $\times$ Income		0.031^{***}	
		(0.001)	
Inv. dist. $\times$ Income			0.675^{***}
			(0.029)
Turnout	0.002	-0.003	-0.013^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
(Log) Population	0.006^{***}	0.007^{***}	0.007^{***}
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
(Log) Municipality population	0.001^{***}	0.001^{***}	0.001^{***}
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military region HQ	-0.015^{***}	-0.018^{***}	-0.019^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	33,769	33,769	33,769
R^2	0.617	0.620	0.621
Adjusted R^2	0.617	0.619	0.620

Note: $+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001$. All models exclude census sections with army facilities from the sample.

Table A10: Spatial Error Models on support for VOX

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	-0.250^{***}	-0.327^{***}	5.305^{**}
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(1.839)
Military facility	0.017^{***}	0.027^{***}	0.037^{***}
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Turnout	-0.019^{***}	-0.003	0.017^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
(Log) Population	0.002^{***}	0.002^{***}	0.007^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(Log) HH Income	0.001^{+}	0.003^{***}	-0.001^{***}
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
(Log) Municipality population	0.034^{***}	0.040^{***}	0.029^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Military capital	-0.008^{**}	-0.023^{***}	-0.015^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Lambda	0.89^{***}	0.91^{***}	1.00^{***}
Observations	20,181	20,181	20,181
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-89,567.300	-81,501.060	-78,956.110

Note: $+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001$. Models 1 includes spatial weights based on queen-type contiguity. Model 2 does so identifying neighbors as sections within 2km. Model 3 uses spatial weights based on the inverse logged distance (m).

Table A11: Spatial Durbin Error Models on support for VOX

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	-0.260^{***}	-0.332^{***}	11.088^{***}
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(1.860)
Military facility	0.022^{***}	0.027^{***}	0.038^{***}
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Military (sp lag)	0.017^{**}	0.019	2.441^{***}
	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.121)
Turnout	-0.019^{***}	0.004	-0.025^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Turnout (sp lag)	-0.003	0.113^{***}	0.563^{***}
	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.038)
(Log) Population	0.002^{***}	0.003^{***}	0.006^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Population (sp lag)	0.001^{+}	0.004^{***}	-0.002^{***}
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
(Log) HH Income	-0.001	0.005^{*}	0.072^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.009)
Income (sp lag)	-0.001	0.001	0.022^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
(Log) Municipality population	0.034^{***}	0.039^{***}	0.039^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Muni population (sp lag)	0.003^{*}	-0.016^{***}	-0.125^{***}
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Military capital	-0.007^{*}	-0.020^{***}	-0.015^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Milit capital (sp lag)	-0.001	-0.006	-0.028^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Lambda	0.89^{***}	0.90^{***}	1.00^{***}
Observations	20,181	20,181	20,181
Akaike Inf. Crit.	-89,573.300	-81,628.430	-79,812.380

Note: $+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001$. Models 1 includes spatial weights based on queen-type contiguity. Model 2 does so identifying neighbors as sections within 2km. Model 3 uses spatial weights based on the inverse logged distance (m).

G Robustness checks (local-level analyses)

Table A12 shows the base results but using support for VOX in November 2019 elections as the dependent variable.

Table A13 shows the results of the base models on spatial diffusion but excluding the sample to census sections within 20km of a section with military facilities, while Table A14 shows the same results but including the interaction with local mean household income. Table A15 repeats these models limiting the sample to census sections in municipalities that have over 50,000 inhabitants, while Table A16 does the same but including the interaction with income. Table A17 limits the sample to census sections in municipalities that were in the past the HQ of military regions, while again Table A18 repeats these models but includign the interaction with income.

Table A12: Support for VOX (November elections) and military presence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(Intercept)	-0.142^{***}	-0.186^{***}	-0.515^{***}	-0.827^{***}	-0.551^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.020)
Military facility	0.040^{***}	0.036^{***}	0.039^{***}	0.046^{***}	0.041^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Turnout (Nov 2019)	-0.068^{***}	-0.057^{***}	-0.150^{***}	-0.158^{***}	-0.175^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.010)
(Log) Population	0.015^{***}	0.019^{***}	0.014^{***}	0.003^{*}	0.011^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(Log) Household income	-0.000	-0.004^{***}	0.004^{*}	0.014^{***}	-0.001^{**}
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.000)
(Log) Municipality pop.	0.017^{***}	0.022^{***}	0.062^{***}	0.087^{***}	0.065^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Military region HQ	-0.026^{***}	-0.018^{***}	-0.038^{***}		-0.020^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)		(0.002)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	33,874	20,164	10,061	5,893	8,476
R^2	0.666	0.717	0.715	0.713	0.822
Adjusted R^2	0.666	0.717	0.714	0.712	0.821

Note: $+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001$. Models 1 includes full sample. Model 2 includes only sections within 20km of military facilities. Model 3 includes only municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants in 2017. Model 4 only includes municipalities that were HQ of main military regions. Model 5 restricts the sample to the wealthiest sections ($> q3$).

Table A13: Support for VOX and nearby military presence, only sections within 20km of military facilities

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	-0.285^{***}	-0.284^{***}	-0.298^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Military in contiguous section	0.014^{***}		
	(0.001)		
Military within 2km		0.009^{***}	
		(0.001)	
Inverse logged distance (m)			0.104^{***}
			(0.021)
Turnout	0.017^{***}	0.015^{***}	0.015^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
(Log) Population	0.009^{***}	0.010^{***}	0.010^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(Log) HH Income	-0.001^{***}	-0.002^{***}	-0.002^{***}
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
(Log) Municipality population	0.029^{***}	0.029^{***}	0.029^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Military region HQ	-0.009^{***}	-0.010^{***}	-0.009^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	20,045	20,045	20,045
R^2	0.670	0.670	0.668
Adjusted R^2	0.669	0.669	0.667

Note: $+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001$. All models exclude census sections with army facilities from the sample. Only including sections within 20km of military facilities.

Table A14: Support for VOX and nearby military presence, only sections within 20km of military facilities

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	-0.271^{***}	-0.235^{***}	0.560^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.048)
Military in contiguous section	-0.251^{***}		
	(0.026)		
Military within 2km		-0.245^{***}	
		(0.014)	
Inverse logged distance (m)			-7.007^{***}
			(0.394)
(Log) Household income	0.027^{***}	0.024^{***}	-0.054^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Contiguous $\times$ Income	0.026^{***}		
	(0.002)		
Within 2km $\times$ Income		0.025^{***}	
		(0.001)	
Inv. dist. $\times$ Income			0.692^{***}
			(0.038)
Turnout	0.017^{***}	0.014^{***}	0.011^{*}
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
(Log) Population	0.009^{***}	0.010^{***}	0.010^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(Log) Municipality population	-0.001^{***}	-0.002^{***}	-0.001^{***}
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military region HQ	-0.009^{***}	-0.012^{***}	-0.011^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	20,045	20,045	20,045
R^2	0.672	0.675	0.673
Adjusted R^2	0.671	0.674	0.672

Note: $+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001$. All models exclude census sections with army facilities from the sample. Only including sections within 20km of military facilities.

Table A15: Support for VOX and nearby military presence, only sections in municipalities of more than 50000 inhabitants

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	-0.763^{***}	-0.762^{***}	-0.811^{***}
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Military in contiguous section	0.015^{***}		
	(0.001)		
Military within 2km		0.006^{***}	
		(0.001)	
Inverse logged distance (m)			0.260^{***}
			(0.025)
Turnout	-0.109^{***}	-0.109^{***}	-0.111^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
(Log) Population	0.003^{***}	0.005^{***}	0.005^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(Log) HH Income	0.017^{***}	0.016^{***}	0.017^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(Log) Municipality population	0.078^{***}	0.077^{***}	0.078^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Military region HQ	-0.056^{***}	-0.056^{***}	-0.058^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,973	9,973	9,973
R^2	0.700	0.697	0.698
Adjusted R^2	0.699	0.696	0.697

Note: $+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001$. All models exclude census sections with army facilities from the sample. Only including sections in municipalities with more than 50000 inhabitants.

Table A16: Support for VOX and nearby military presence, only sections in municipalities of more than 50000 inhabitants

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	-0.750^{***}	-0.687^{***}	0.117
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.077)
Military in contiguous section	-0.160^{***}		
	(0.031)		
Military within 2km		-0.167^{***}	
		(0.015)	
Inverse logged distance (m)			-6.690^{***}
			(0.553)
(Log) Household income	0.076^{***}	0.069^{***}	-0.013^{+}
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.007)
Contiguous × Income	0.017^{***}		
	(0.003)		
Within 2km × Income		0.017^{***}	
		(0.001)	
Inv. dist. × Income			0.672^{***}
			(0.053)
Turnout	-0.107^{***}	-0.100^{***}	-0.100^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
(Log) Population	0.003^{***}	0.005^{***}	0.005^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(Log) Municipality population	0.017^{***}	0.016^{***}	0.016^{***}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Military region HQ	-0.056^{***}	-0.056^{***}	-0.057^{***}
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,973	9,973	9,973
R^2	0.701	0.701	0.703
Adjusted R^2	0.699	0.700	0.702

Note: $+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001$. All models exclude census sections with army facilities from the sample. Only including sections in municipalities with more than 50000 inhabitants.

Table A17: Support for VOX and nearby military presence, only sections in military region capitals

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	-0.354^{***}	-0.361^{***}	-0.384^{***}
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.033)
Military in contiguous section	0.018^{***}		
	(0.002)		
Military within 2km		0.003^{***}	
		(0.001)	
Inverse logged distance (m)			0.147^{***}
			(0.030)
Turnout	-0.150^{***}	-0.152^{***}	-0.150^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
(Log) Population	-0.004^{***}	-0.003^{*}	-0.003^{*}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(Log) HH Income	-0.031^{***}	-0.032^{***}	-0.031^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
(Log) Municipality population	0.101^{***}	0.101^{***}	0.101^{***}
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Military region HQ			
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,855	5,855	5,855
R^2	0.737	0.733	0.733
Adjusted R^2	0.736	0.732	0.732

Note: $+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001$. All models exclude census sections with army facilities from the sample. Only including sections in municipalities that were HQ of main military regions (Barcelona, Burgos, A Coruña, Granada, Madrid, Sevilla, Valencia, Valladolid, and Zaragoza).

Table A18: Support for VOX and nearby military presence, only sections in military region capitals

	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)	-0.352^{***}	-0.317^{***}	1.011^{***}
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.106)
Military in contiguous section	-0.122^{**}		
	(0.044)		
Military within 2km		-0.222^{***}	
		(0.020)	
Inverse logged distance (m)			-10.644^{***}
			(0.784)
(Log) Household income	0.099^{***}	0.089^{***}	-0.040^{***}
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.010)
Contiguous × Income	0.013^{**}		
	(0.004)		
Within 2km × Income		0.022^{***}	
		(0.002)	
Inv. dist. × Income			1.035^{***}
			(0.075)
Turnout	-0.148^{***}	-0.137^{***}	-0.135^{***}
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
(Log) Population	-0.004^{***}	-0.002^{+}	-0.002^{+}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
(Log) Municipality population	-0.031^{***}	-0.027^{***}	-0.027^{***}
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Military region HQ			
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,855	5,855	5,855
R^2	0.737	0.739	0.741
Adjusted R^2	0.737	0.738	0.741

Note: $+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001$. All models exclude census sections with army facilities from the sample. Only including sections in municipalities that were HQ of main military regions (Barcelona, Burgos, A Coruña, Granada, Madrid, Sevilla, Valencia, Valladolid, and Zaragoza).

H Local-level results using AP/PP

In this section we show results of running the base models changing the dependent variable to support for *Partido Popular* (Popular Party, PP), the main right-wing political party in Spain (before 1989, we use support for its predecessor, *Alianza Popular*, AP). We run separate models for each election since 1982[2], using the same five different samples we also use in the main analyses: all census sections in Spain, sections within 20km of military facilities, sections in cities over 50,000 inhabitants, sections in former military region HQ,[3] and high-income sections ($> Q_3$). The main independent variable is whether a census section has any military facilities in 2021. All models control for turnout in each election, census section-level population (in 2017), municipality-level population (in 2017), whether the section is in a former military region HQ, mean household income (in 2017), and include province fixed effects.

Figure A5 shows the coefficient estimate for military facilities. Results show that there was an association between the location of military bases and general right-wing electoral support. This association was stronger particularly after 2008, when the territorial conflict became more salient in Spain, when Catalonia approved a new Statute of Autonomy, which prompted a strong rejection by the nationalist right in the rest of Spain, and was eventually modified by the Spanish Constitutional Court. This pattern suggests that the effect of military bases is driven primarily by its effect on nationalism, as we suggest in the main text. Moreover, the association between military bases and support for PP decreases markedly in 2019, when VOX became a main party in Spain. Again, this suggests that the effect of military bases on electoral preferences is probably explained by its effect on nationalist attitudes.

[2]We do not look at elections in the 1977 and 1979 because there is no census section-level data on electoral results.

[3]Barcelona, Burgos, A Coruña, Granada, Madrid, Sevilla, Valencia, Valladolid, and Zaragoza.



Figure A5: Military facilities and support for PP/AP

I Accounting for the location of military facilities in Spain

In this section we look at the location of military barracks in 1920 to probe the problem of endogeneity in the current location of military facilities and support for VOX. Even if, ideally, we would need to know how the location of military facilities has evolved across time, particularly during the Francoist regime and the late-twentieth century, that information is not publicly available. However, the barracks existing in 1920 was probably close to the peak number of military barracks in Spain, so it is a second-best option to code the disappearance of old bases and the creation of new ones.

We hand-coded all military barracks existing in 1920 from a set a catalogs compiled by the General Command of Engineers of each military region, available at the General Military Archive in the Instituto de Historia y Cultura Militar in Madrid.[4] Figure A6 shows a sample from the original archives, which included a separate document for each of the 10 military regions existing in 1920 (8 regions in mainland Spain plus the two Captaincies of the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands).[5] We then geo-coded all military barracks that had a maximum ordinal capacity of at least 100 men, in order to distinguish barracks from small buildings or depots.

Figure A7 shows the location of the 1920 military facilities, together with the contemporary facilities that we use in the main text. As we discuss in the main text, the geographical spread of the military shrank considerably during the last hundred years, and in many cases, facilities moved the city centre to surrounding areas with more available space. Former military barracks now host universities, cultural centers, or city halls, to list some common examples.

Table A19 shows the results of a model that use as dependent variable whether a given census section lost military facilities between 1920 and 2021, looking only at census sections that had such a facility in 1920. In other words, it analyzes the correlates of having had removed, abandoned, or repurposed military facilities in these sections.

[4] https://patrimoniocultural.defensa.gob.es/es/centros/archivo-militar-madrid/portada (accessed 24/05/2023).

[5] See the original text of the 1918 reform (https://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE//1918/181/A00823-00841.pdf, accessed 24/05/2023), or a map at https://bit.ly/3URYpMw (accessed 24/05/2023).

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

Plazas	Nombres	CAPACIDAD ORDINARIA Hombres	CAPACIDAD ORDINARIA Caballos	CAPACIDAD ORDINARIA Material	CAPACIDAD EXTRAORDINARIA Hombres	CAPACIDAD EXTRAORDINARIA Caballos	CAPACIDAD EXTRAORDINARIA Material	Destino actual	Estado de conservación	Propiedad	Obras proyectadas o en ejecución	7
Badajoz	Cuartel de Gitanos	8	90	"	10	90	"	Ocupado por el ganado de las Secciones de ametralladoras de los 2 Regimientos de Infantería.	M.	Del Estado	Ninguna	
Ciudad Real	Cuartel de Tahonas	70	25	"	100	25	"	Utilizado en pabellones del Gobernador y del Secretario del Gobierno Militar de la Plaza, servicios del Cuerpo de Intendencia, Zona de Recluta y Batallón 2ª Reserva nº10.	R.C.	id.	En estudio el proyecto de adaptación de la planta baja de este Cuartel para establecer los servicios de Intendencia.	
Id.	Id.de la Misericordia	516	391	"	600	391	"	Se están llevando á cabo las obras necesarias para ponerlo en condiciones de alojamiento del 1º Regimiento de Artillería pesada.	R.C.	id.	Proyecto de reparación general de este Cuartel aprobado por R.O.21 de marzo de 1919, id.de instalación provisional del 1º Regimiento de Artillª pesada por R.O.de 15 de Septiembre del mismo año, y proyecto para completar el alojamiento provisional del citado Regimiento aprobado por R.O.de 14 de noviembre del citado año.	
Olivenza	Id.de Caballería	120	136	"	150	141	"	Entregado al Ayuntamiento de Llerena para Escuelas,según R.O.de 18 de mayo de 1917	M.	id.	Por R.O.de 7 de noviembre de 1914, se dispuso la formación de un proyecto de reparaciones que fué cursado á la Superioridad sin que hasta la fecha haya recaido resolución	
Mérida	Id.provisional de Artillería.	300	120	"	390	150	"	Destinado al alojamiento provisional del 2ºRegimtº de Artillería Pesada.	R.C.	Particular	Por R.O.comunicada de 27 de febrero del año actual se dispuso la formación de un proyecto de saneamiento de las cuadras de este Cuartel que fué cursado á la Superioridad sin que hasta la fecha haya recaido resolución	
Olivenza	Id.de Caballería	340	287	"	400	287	"	Ocupado por fuerzas destacadas del Regimiento Cazadores de Villarrobledo 2C de Caballería.	R.C.	Del Estado	En estudio el proyecto de reparación general de este Cuartel y aprobado por R.O.de 10 de abril actual el presupuesto para reparar el hundimiento del piso de los retretes.	
Id.	Id.de Sn.Juan de Dios	250	"	"	250	"	"	Ocupado por fuerzas de Carabineros	M.	Id.	N.	

(A) = El Regimiento de Castilla tiene 8 C.T.R.y una cocina de campaña, en el Parque de Artillería, por no tener cobertizos suficientes en el cuartel que ocupa.
(B) = El Regimiento de Gravelinas tiene 12 C.T.R.en el citado Parque por las mismas razones que el anterior, teniendo en su cuartel 5 C.T.R.y una cocina de campaña.
(C) = El Regimiento de Villarrobledo tiene 9 C.T.R.colocados en las galerías y Patios del Cuartel, así como una cocina de campaña en igual forma por no tener cobertizos suficientes.

COMANDANCIA de TOLEDO

Toledo	Trinidad	"	"	"	"	"	"	Ninguno	Ruinoso	Del Estado	Laq del proyecto de reconstrucción para instalar los servicios de Reclutamiento y Depósito de Intendencia, cuyo proyecto se halla en estudio.	
Id.	San Lázaro	400	"	"	500	"	"	Colegio de María Cristina para Huérfanos de Infantería.	Bueno	id.	N.	(1)

3

Figure A6: Sample from archives on the location of military barracks in 1920

The independent variables are various measures at either the section- or municipality-level at different points in time, including section population, municipality-level population, and mean household income in 2017, municipality-level population change between 1930 and 2011, a binary measure of whether the municipality was a former military region capital, the share of rightist support in 1936 elections, and the mean of electoral support for *Alianza Popular* (AP) or *Partido Popular* (PP)—the main successor party of the Francoist regime—in the three elections in the 1980s.[6] The model that includes rightist support in 1936 has fewer observations because data for electoral results during the 1930s is not available in all provinces.

Results show that local political dynamics throughout the twentieth century did not play a role in the relocation of military bases. Although the coefficients for rightist

[6] AP, later refounded in 1989 as PP, was the main successor party of the Francoist regime and is still active as the mainstream right-wing party in Spain. We measure mean support throughout the 1980s to measure underlying rightist support independent of election-to-election changes and to account for the growth in support for AP/PP during these years. We do not include elections in the late 1970s because data is not available at the census tract level.

Figure A7: Location of military facilities in 1920 and 2021

support in the 1930s and 1980s are negative, they are far from being significant. If anything, military bases were less likely to be abandoned in sections located in major cities that had been the HQ of military regions during the Francoist regime.

Next, we run another set of models when we use as dependent variable the location of *new* military facilities. In other words, we use a binary dependent variable that indicates whether a given census section currently has military facilities but did not have them in 1920. We include the same independent variables as in the previous models. In this case, we estimate the models on the full sample, so we also include province fixed effects.

Table A20 shows the results. Although there is an association between the location of new military bases and *current* income levels, we do not find any evidence that

Table A19: Abandoned military facilities between 1920 and 2021

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Pop. change, 1930-2011 (municipality)	-0.012	0.855	0.210
	(0.205)	(1.047)	(0.489)
(Log) Population, 2017	1.303	-0.171	0.207
	(1.112)	(1.943)	(1.409)
Military region HQ	-4.485*	-9.530	-4.984*
	(2.257)	(8.293)	(2.419)
(Log) Municipality pop, 2017	0.409	0.853	0.570
	(0.428)	(1.081)	(0.467)
(Log) Household income, 2017	-0.423	1.563	0.597
	(1.125)	(2.173)	(1.763)
Rightist support, 1936 (muni-level)		-18.439	
		(15.015)	
AP/PP support, mean 1980s			-6.101
			(3.829)
n	99	49	95
AIC	58.2	35.2	52.3

Note: + p $<$ 0.1, * p $<$ 0.05, ** p $<$ 0.01, *** p $<$ 0.001.

rightist electoral support either before the civil war of after the transition to democracy explains where new military facilities were built.

Finally, we now probe whether the location of military bases in 1920 is able to predict current levels of support for VOX. If this was the case, there would probably be a problem of confounding. To test this, Table A21 repeats the base analyses from the main text, where we analyze the relationship between military presence and far-right support (VOX share in April 2019 elections) at the level of census sections, but using as independent variables (1) military presence in 1920, (2) military presence in 2021, replicating the main text analysis, (3) a dummy indicating that there was military presence in 1920 but was lost, and (4) this same last model but limiting the sample to sections that had military presence in 1920. Table A22 repeats these last analyses but restricting the sample to census sections located in municipalities that had more than 50,000 inhabitants in 2017. Table A23 does the same limiting the sample to census sections located in the former military region capitals (Barcelona, Burgos, A Coruña, Granada, Madrid, Sevilla, Valencia, Valladolid, and Zaragoza). Table A24 limits the

Table A20: New military facilities between 1920 and 2021

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Pop. change, 1930-2011 (municipality)	-0.025+	-0.074	-0.027
	(0.015)	(0.126)	(0.024)
(Log) Population, 2017	0.120	0.272	0.288
	(0.210)	(0.552)	(0.237)
Military region HQ	-0.556	0.305	-0.174
	(0.439)	(1.281)	(0.511)
(Log) Municipality pop, 2017	0.108	0.162	0.045
	(0.069)	(0.206)	(0.079)
(Log) Household income, 2017	1.574***	0.677	1.505***
	(0.275)	(0.823)	(0.367)
Rightist support, 1936 (muni-level)		0.650	
		(2.602)	
AP/PP support, mean 1980s			0.930
			(0.849)
n	33870	9030	26642
AIC	1653.3	279.7	1293.3
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Province FE not shown.

sample to the wealthiest census sections, those in the highest quartile of the mean household income distribution.

In all cases, military barracks in 1920 are not correlated with support for VOX. While in some cases—when restricting the sample to large cities, HQ of military regions, or wealthy sections—the coefficient for military barracks in 1920 is positive and significant, its size decreases and stops being significant when contemporary military facilities are included in the model. This indicates that any effect of the location of old barracks is due to their coincidence with contemporary facilities in some cases.

Table A21: VOX support in 2019 and military presence at different periods

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Military facility in 1920	0.005	0.002		
	(0.004)	(0.004)		
Military facility in 2021		0.040***		
		(0.003)		
Facility in 1920 but abandoned			0.000	-0.043**
			(0.004)	(0.015)
(Log) Population, 2017	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	-0.020+
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.012)
Military region HQ	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.030
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.021)
(Log) Municipality pop, 2017	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.004
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.005)
(Log) Household income, 2017	0.023***	0.023***	0.023***	0.091***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.021)
n	33905	33905	33905	99
R^2	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.76
Adj. R^2	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.68
AIC	-128727.2	-128887.3	-128724.9	-341.8
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: + p $<$ 0.1, * p $<$ 0.05, ** p $<$ 0.01, *** p $<$ 0.001. Province FE not shown.

Table A22: VOX support in 2019 and military presence at different periods, in census sections located in cities above 50,000 inhabitants in 2017

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Military facility in 1920	0.011**	0.006		
	(0.004)	(0.004)		
Military facility in 2021		0.033***		
		(0.003)		
Facility in 1920 but abandoned			0.003	-0.028
			(0.004)	(0.018)
(Log) Population, 2017	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	-0.065**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.021)
Military region HQ	-0.058***	-0.057***	-0.058***	-0.279
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.242)
(Log) Municipality pop, 2017	0.017***	0.017***	0.017***	0.080
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.084)
(Log) Household income, 2017	0.081***	0.080***	0.081***	0.158***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.036)
n	10064	10064	10064	55
R^2	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.76
Adj. R^2	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.66
AIC	-42257.0	-42369.0	-42250.3	-175.8
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: + p $<$ 0.1, * p $<$ 0.05, ** p $<$ 0.01, *** p $<$ 0.001. Province FE not shown.

Table A23: VOX support in 2019 and military presence at different periods, in census sections located in former military region capitals

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Military facility in 1920	0.011*	0.003		
	(0.005)	(0.005)		
Military facility in 2021		0.038***		
		(0.005)		
Facility in 1920 but abandoned			0.000	-0.023
			(0.005)	(0.018)
(Log) Population, 2017	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.066**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.023)
(Log) Municipality pop, 2017	-0.035***	-0.034***	-0.035***	-0.156***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.024)
(Log) Household income, 2017	0.105***	0.104***	0.105***	0.184***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.039)
n	5893	5893	5893	36
R^2	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.78
Adj. R^2	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73
AIC	-25747.5	-25813.8	-25741.9	-117.3
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: + p $<$ 0.1, * p $<$ 0.05, ** p $<$ 0.01, *** p $<$ 0.001. Province FE not shown.

Table A24: VOX support in 2019 and military presence at different periods, in the wealthiest census sections ($¿q3$)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Military facility in 1920	0.010*	0.006		
	(0.005)	(0.005)		
Military facility in 2021		0.039***		
		(0.004)		
Facility in 1920 but abandoned			0.006	-0.006
			(0.005)	(0.026)
(Log) Population, 2017	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***	-0.067*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.027)
Military region HQ	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.010***	0.106
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.120)
(Log) Municipality pop, 2017	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.048
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.036)
(Log) Household income, 2017	0.085***	0.084***	0.085***	0.163*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.058)
n	8477	8477	8477	40
R^2	0.81	0.82	0.81	0.83
Adj. R^2	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.70
AIC	-35550.0	-35643.1	-35546.6	-124.7
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: + p $<$ 0.1, * p $<$ 0.05, ** p $<$ 0.01, *** p $<$ 0.001. Province FE not shown.

J Full results from CSES analyses

Figure A8 shows the coefficient of being in the military for all the countries in the sample, while Figure A9 displays graphically the results for all the variables included in the model.



Figure A8: Coefficient estimate and 95% CI of being in the military on ideological self-placement



Figure A9: Coefficient plot for each of the country models on ideological self-placement

K Additional survey analyses in Germany

We show here analyses of the link between military affiliation and support for the far-right party *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) in Germany, using data from Politbarometer (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2022), a monthly election poll that has been active since the late 1970s. As we mention in the main text, there are reason to consider Germany a least-likely case to explore this relationship, given that its institutional nature and its evolution since World War II. In the comparative analysis we show in the main text, Germany is one of the countries where the ideological differences between individuals in the military and the rest is closer to 0 and not significant. Moreover, it is one of the few cases where there is a military unit focused on avoiding cases of political extremism within its ranks. Particularly after 2016, the *Bundeswehr* doubled down on these efforts, and between 2016 and late 2021, 225 members of the German military were expelled because of political extremism, 90% of which were cases of right-wing extremism (Bundestag, 2022).

However, even in this case, we find some evidence of the link between the military and the far-right, even if less robust and less consistent in time than in the case of Spain. Figure A10 shows the mean level of vote intention among individuals in the military and the rest, pooling together all observations yearly between 2013 and 2020. Figure A11 shows the same group averages but focusing on party attachment, namely, the share of individuals who report the AfD as the party they feel attached to. In this case, we only include observations since 2016, which is the first year this option was included in the surveys. In both cases, we see a civil-military gap in support for AfD peaking around 2016 and decreasing thereafter. This trend is consistent with the initial growth of AfD—related to the 2015 refugee crisis—being stronger among the military, but decreasing afterwards, possibly because of the institutional oversight we refer to above and the influence of some key events of political violence. Actually, a recent report about the risk of right-wing extremism within the Germany military

claims that the problem worsened with the emergence of AfD around 2015 (Bennhold, 2020).



Figure A10: Vote intention to AfD by year in Germany, Politbarometer (2013–2020)



Figure A11: Party attachment to AfD by year in Germany, Politbarometer (2016–2020)

Table A25 and Table A26 replicate this findings using logistic models, where we additionally control for gender and age groups, and include survey (monthly) fixed effects. Results are consistent, even if they fail to reach significance in some cases. We find evidence of a significant (at 90% level) gap in vote intention for AfD in 2014, and a larger and significant effect of being in the military for party attachment in 2016.

Together, these results suggest that even in a case like Germany there is a potential affinity between the military and the far-right.

Table A25: Military occupation and vote intention for AfD in Germany

	Pooled	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Military	−0.036	0.537	0.727+	0.525	0.334	0.159	−2.029*	−0.878	−0.899
	(0.185)	(0.599)	(0.439)	(0.434)	(0.411)	(0.429)	(1.008)	(0.723)	(1.014)
Female	−0.956***	−0.909***	−0.946***	−0.935***	−0.958***	−0.909***	−0.910***	−1.037***	−1.102***
	(0.020)	(0.075)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.069)
Age 40-59	0.383***	0.188*	0.054	0.143+	0.395***	0.485***	0.451***	0.519***	0.581***
	(0.026)	(0.096)	(0.082)	(0.086)	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.073)	(0.092)
Age 60+	0.152***	−0.124	0.013	−0.117	0.187**	0.271***	0.150*	0.344***	0.195*
	(0.027)	(0.102)	(0.083)	(0.088)	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.074)	(0.095)
n	253 403	40 001	30 377	30 051	30 599	36 689	30 394	28 097	27 195
AIC	103 206.1	7853.2	10 798.8	10 559.2	16 964.0	16 514.8	17 439.1	13 535.9	9514.0
Survey FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Military variable refers to ISCO occupation groups 0. Survey FE not shown. Source data: Politbarometer, 2013–2020.

Table A26: Military occupation and party attachment for AfD in Germany

	Pooled	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Military	−0.064	1.655**	−0.427	−0.837	−0.594	−11.906
	(0.384)	(0.530)	(1.009)	(1.009)	(1.011)	(220.384)
Female	−0.934***	−0.933***	−0.970***	−0.958***	−0.796***	−1.064***
	(0.041)	(0.113)	(0.092)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.099)
Age 40-59	0.255***	0.008	0.059	0.214*	0.411***	0.554***
	(0.050)	(0.133)	(0.107)	(0.099)	(0.108)	(0.129)
Age 60+	−0.064	−0.371**	−0.250*	−0.073	0.198+	0.066
	(0.052)	(0.141)	(0.112)	(0.102)	(0.110)	(0.135)
n	253 403	30 599	36 689	30 394	28 097	27 195
AIC	30 592.2	4134.1	6278.7	7597.1	7120.4	5385.0
Survey FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Military variable refers to ISCO occupation groups 0. Survey FE not shown. Source data: Politbarometer, 2013–2020. Models start in 2016 because that is the year when AfD starts to appear in party attachment questions.

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